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ABSTRACT 	  
The phenomenon of ‘premenstrual syndrome’ has attracted considerable 
attention during the early half of the twentieth century. Over the years, medical 
researchers and physicians have concluded that premenstrual changes could 
cause women severe distress and impair their ability to function at work and at 
home. In 1994, the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) 
(American Psychiatric Association 1994) used the term ‘premenstrual dysphoric 
disorder’ (PMDD) to refer to these premenstrual changes. At present, PMDD is 
being proposed for inclusion as a new category in DSM 5, due for release in May 
2013. This inclusion means women who experience premenstrual changes could 
be classified with a mental disorder. This study aimed to explore how 
premenstrual changes evolved from a normal biological fact of life into a 
psychiatric disorder.  
The study examined the way premenstrual changes have been constructed in 
psychiatric and psychological literature. The study was informed by a critical 
realist epistemology and adopted a Foucauldian discourse analysis methodology. 
The study took a genealogical approach to explore the discursive and non-
discursive practices that have influenced the medicalisation of premenstrual 
changes in DSM. 
The study found three interrelated ‘truths’ about women’s premenstrual changes 
that have been produced and disseminated by psychiatrists and psychologists to 
reify PMDD as a psychiatric problem. Psychiatrist and psychologists have drawn 
on the discourses of science and medicine to render these constructions or 
‘truths’ intelligible. The literature focused primarily on negative mood changes 
and failed to consider positive premenstrual experiences that many women 
report. The literature did not consider premenstrual experiences from a non-
biomedical perspective and neglected the role that relational, social, economic, 
cultural and structural factors play in contributing to or exacerbating premenstrual 
experiences. This means that the published research has excluded aspects of 
premenstrual experiences that could stand in contrast to the dominant accounts 
reported throughout the literature. The study found that the construct of PMDD 
taps into powerful cultural ideas about what it means to be a woman and what is 
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considered feminine. The study shows that the concept of PMDD is grounded in 
a historical tradition of problematizing menstruation. This increased tendency to 
view menstruation or aspects of menstruation as problematic does not benefit 
women.  
 
We must recognise that the way we construct menstruation or menstrual cycle 
experiences has an effect on the way we view women and the way we treat 
them. The inclusion of PMDD may devalue women and result in the 
discrimination, marginalization, and stigmatization of women. This study 
recommends that the category of PMDD be excluded from DSM 5.	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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION  
 
The female reproductive system, and in particular, menstruation has received 
considerable attention throughout human history. For millennia, most of the 
theorizing about menstruation and its effects on women has been recorded by 
men and shaped by particular religious and social institutions that were (and 
continue to be) male dominated. At present, popular culture as well as medical, 
psychological and scientific literatures have led us to believe that the effects of 
periodic bleeding in women have an inescapable destructive influence on 
women’s lives (Ussher 1989). Many women, therefore, view menstruation as a 
‘curse’, inconvenient, embarrassing and at worse an illness (Ussher 1989). In the 
early twentieth century, there was a shift away from menstruation being the focus 
of scientific research to a particular aspect of menstruation, namely the 
premenstrual phase. Scientific study sought to find out what effects the 
premenstrual phase of the menstrual cycle had on women’s psychological state 
or behaviour. A significant amount of research concluded that premenstrual 
symptoms could cause women severe distress, diminish their quality of life, and 
impair their ability to function at work and in relationships. At present, the term 
‘premenstrual dysphoric disorder’ (PMDD) is being used to refer to the distress 
and incapacitating effects of premenstrual symptomatology (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994, 2013). In articulating this thesis, I will trace the development of 
the concept of ‘PMDD’ and focus on how it has been constructed and what 
implications these constructions have for the psychology of the women. 
 
1.1 Aims of the Research 
 
The main aim of the research is to explore how premenstrual changes evolved 
from a normal biological fact of life into a psychiatric disorder. The study will focus 
on premenstrual changes rather than the broader topic of menstruation. Since the 
1930s, premenstrual changes, rather than menstruation, have been the focus of 
scientific research. The extensive research on this topic has led to the 
medicalization of premenstrual changes. This study proposes to explore how this 
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medicalization took place. The study will focus on the construction of 
premenstrual changes within the psychiatric and psychological literature.  
 
1.2 Analytic Approach  
 
My analytic approach will be discussed in more detail in chapter two. This 
research is informed by a critical realist epistemology. Researchers taking a 
critical realist position support the social constructionist assumption that language 
constructs our ‘social realities’ and acknowledge that broader social, historical 
and cultural events impact upon human experience (Sims-Schouten, Riley & 
Willig 2007: 102). For my analytic method, I have employed a post-structuralist 
approach to Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) drawing on the work of 
Foucault (1982). In essence, I am analyzing the discourses and discursive 
resources that have been used in the production and regulation of ‘PMDD’. A 
post-structuralist approach undermines science's claims to objectivity and denies 
the possibility of objectively knowing a reality outside of discourse. Post-
structuralist theory emphasizes that our knowledges of ‘the real’ are always 
socio-historically contingent and inevitably intertwined with power. Post-
structuralist theory asserts that language does not simply describe reality; it has 
the power to construct certain realities as the ‘truth’ (Wetherell & White 1992 in 
Malson 1998: 37). Additionally, I will be drawing on feminist approaches to 
critically question the concept of ‘PMDD’ and locate premenstrual changes within 
a socio-cultural discursive context.  
 
1.3 Historical and Cultural background 
 
Ussher (1991: 22) argues that the ‘menstrual taboo’ is one of the most pervasive 
taboos affecting women all around the world. Historically, menstruating women 
have been confined to menstruation huts away from their husband and children 
and were forbidden from touching or preparing food for fears of contamination 
(Frazer 1938 in Ussher 1991: 22). A man who engages in sexual intercourse with 
women during this period has been warned that he will risk the destruction of his 
brain, eyesight and manhood (Weidegar 1985 in Ussher 1991: 22). Noddings 
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(1989: 39) reported that menstruating women were thought to be ‘infected with an 
evil spirit or to be paying the price for an essential evil spirit that is part of her 
nature’. Seen as polluted, evil and contaminated, menstruating women have 
been barred from worship (McLaughlin 1974 in Ussher 1991: 22). Ussher (1989) 
argues that the menstrual taboo is still prevalent today but presented in a more 
sophisticated guise of ‘premenstrual syndrome’.  
 
The scientific study of menstruation and the effects of menstruation on women’s 
wellbeing, behaviour and abilities began during the latter part of the nineteenth 
century. The development coincided with the emergence of feminism and 
demands for access to higher education, professions and electoral voting for 
women. Questions were raised about how the changes in women’s lives, if 
granted access to higher education and professions, would impact upon the 
family (Walker 1997). Amongst male writers and scientists, the female 
reproductive system became the centre of attention. Theories emerged that 
located the cause of women’s wellbeing, madness and physical illness to their 
reproductive system. Prominent physicians and scientists portrayed menstruation 
negatively and drew conclusions that menstruation can cause unpredictable 
behaviour, insanity and ill health in women. In 1843, Dr. William DeWees of the 
University of Pennsylvania used the term ‘melancholies of menstruation’ to 
describe the uterus as an organ that ‘creates, exalts, or defines diseases, in 
every portion of the body’ (Taylor 2005: 228). The typical symptoms of a uterine 
disorder, according to William Byford, a physician writing in America in 1864, 
were weight loss, irritability, headaches, and ‘hysterical fits of crying’ (Wood 
1973: 29). In late nineteenth century, there was a shift in medical thought – the 
uterus was no longer the dominant organ; instead the ovaries were thought to 
control women’s emotions and behaviour (Walker 1997). Henry Maudsley wrote 
in 1873: ‘The monthly activity of the ovaries…has a notable effect upon the mind 
and body…Most women at that time [during menstruation] are susceptible, 
irritable and capricious’ (Maudsley 1873 in Walker 1997: 35). Alongside 
Maudsley, Edward Clarke, a professor of Harvard University, believed that 
intellectual activity during menstruation would damage the reproductive system 
and could potentially cause infertility. Clarke argued that it was brainwork, rather 
than physical work, which damages the reproductive system. He argued that girls 
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who worked in factories would suffer less than schoolgirls because they ‘work the 
brain less…hence they have stronger bodies’ (Clarke 1873 in Walker 1997: 40). 
Despite evidence showing that menstruation did not cause reproductive or 
psychological difficulties (e.g. Jacobi 1877 cited in Walker 1997: 43), it was the 
opinions of medical professionals (particularly men) that formed the negative 
views of menstruation, which continued into the twentieth century. However, with 
the ‘discoveries’ of the female sex hormones in the 1920s research studies were 
no longer concerned with menstruation per se; rather the focus of research 
interest grew towards the premenstrual phase of the menstrual cycle. This 
marked a significant shift towards the medicalisation of premenstrual distress 
rather than menstruation.  
 
1.4 The Modern Period and Biomedical Understanding 
 
1.4.1 Premenstrual changes, mood and wellbeing  
 
The premenstrual phase, also known as the luteal phase of the menstrual cycle, 
has been associated with some commonly reported changes such as fluid 
retention, acne, pains in the muscles, fatigue, irritability, tension, sadness, and 
feeling out of control (e.g. Frank 1931; Greene & Dalton 1953). These changes 
continue to be reported in the present time (DSM 2013). Scientific and medical 
literatures have focused on the impact of these changes on women’s general 
mood and wellbeing and her ability to function at work and at home. Many studies 
have reported that women who describe themselves as suffering from negative 
premenstrual changes experience high levels of physical and psychological 
problems (Rubinow et al., 1986). Some of these include sleep problems (Hong et 
al., 2012), reduced health related quality of life (Heinemann et al., 2010) and 
reduced desire to participate in hobbies, social activities and relationships 
(Heinemann et al., 2010). Other studies have found that women who present with 
severe premenstrual symptoms do not cope well with stress (Girdler et al., 1998) 
and are less likely to use social support (Mitchell & Mitchell 1998). A few studies 
have shown that women who experience severe premenstrual symptoms were 
more likely to use coping methods such as avoidance and self-medication in the 
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form of increased smoking and alcohol intake (Ehlers et al., 1996). A relatively 
small number of recent studies report that women who present with severe 
premenstrual symptoms experience reduce brain activity associated with 
attention and motor control (Bannbers et al., 2012), experience deficits in working 
memory (Yen et al., 2012) and are impaired cognitively (Reed et al., 2008). Some 
studies have also found that women who presented with premenstrual symptoms 
had increased absenteeism from work and impaired work productivity whilst at 
work (Heinemann et al., 2010).   
 
Previous research have also reported that women who seek treatment for 
premenstrual distress report higher than average incidents of sexual abuse 
(Golding & Taylor 1996) and sexual problems (Greenblatt et al., 1942). Moreover, 
numerous past studies have found that women who experience severe 
premenstrual distress also experience higher levels of affective disorders 
especially depression and anxiety (e.g. Halbreich & Endicott 1985). A few studies 
have reported that women who are diagnosed with PMDD have a high risk of 
suicidality and exhibit aggressive and dangerous behaviour (e.g. Endicott & 
Halbreich 1998). A great deal of the research effort went into reporting that 
premenstrual distress is discrete and different from other psychiatric disorders 
(e.g. Epperson et al., 2012). Researchers have reported that the prevalence rate 
of PMDD is between 3-5% (APA 1994).  
 
1.4.2 Etiology and treatment of premenstrual distress 
 
In the last 30 years, there has been an increase in biomedical research focusing 
on the etiology and treatment of premenstrual distress. A large number of earlier 
studies searched for endocrine factors to explain the presentation of 
premenstrual distress. These studies have attributed the cause of premenstrual 
symptoms to increased estrogen hormone (e.g. Frank 1931) and lack of 
progesterone hormone (Greene & Dalton 1953). The variations in the level of 
estrogen and progesterone have been reported in many studies (Benedek & 
Rubenstein 1939; Backstrom & Mattson 1975; Calhoun & Burnette 1984). These 
earlier studies assumed that premenstrual distress was caused by one factor in 
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the body and could be treated by one factor i.e. by reducing estrogen production 
(Frank 1931) or increasing progesterone hormone (Dalton 1954).  
 
More recently, the research studies have focused on the brain and its interaction 
with the ovarian system as a source of dysfunction. A few recent studies have 
reported brain abnormalities in women diagnosed with PMDD, including gray 
matter abnormalities (Berman et al., 2012), decreased glutamate levels (Batra et 
al., 2008), and decreased melatonin secretion (Parry et al., 1995). At present, the 
cause of premenstrual distress is connected with malfunctions of the 
serotoninergic system, in particular low serotonin density (Pearlstein & Steiner 
2008; Halbreich 1996). As a result of these formulations, women considered to 
have PMDD have been treated with psychiatric drug Serotonin Selective Re-
uptake Inhibitors (SSRIs) to increase serotonin levels. Numerous studies have 
reported that women who complain of premenstrual distress show marked 
improvements in premenstrual symptomatology when treated with SSRIs (e.g. 
Pearlstein et al., 1997). Recent reviews on the treatment of PMDD also reported 
high efficacy of SSRI in reducing premenstrual symptomatology (e.g. Pearlstein & 
Steiner 2008; Yonkers et al., 2008; Cunningham et al., 2009).  
 
1.5 The Evolution of the PMDD Category in the DSM 
 
In 1931, Robert Frank became the first gynaecologist to define a set of symptoms 
related to the premenstrual phase. Frank (1931) used the term ‘premenstrual 
tension’ (PMT) to describe physical and mental tension that he believed women 
experienced in the premenstrual week. In 1953, ‘premenstrual tension’ was 
relabelled as ‘premenstrual syndrome’ (PMS) by a British General Practitioner, 
Katharina Dalton, and a British Endocrinologist, Dr. Raymond Greene (Greene & 
Dalton 1953). In the 1980s, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) included 
PMS under the name of ‘late luteal phase dysphoric disorder’ (LLPDD) in the 
appendix of the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders third edition 
(DSM-III-R) (APA 1987). Subsequently, LLPDD was changed to ‘premenstrual 
dysphoric disorder’ (PMDD) and was included in the appendix of DSM-IV (APA 
1994). At present, the DSM 5 Work Group has recommended that PMDD be 
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moved from the appendix to reside as a diagnosis in the Mood Disorders section 
of the manual (APA 2013). The fifth edition (DSM 5) is being prepared for 
publication in May 2013 after a lengthy process of consultation.  
 
1.5.1 Diagnostic Criteria for PMDD 
 
According to DSM 5 Mood Disorders Work Group (APA 2013), a woman may 
have PMDD if she experiences five or more emotional, behavioural or 
physiological, changes during the week before menstruating. Interestingly, 
physical symptoms have been included as part of a psychiatric diagnosis. The 
diagnostic criteria for PMDD in the DSM are below:   
A. In the majority of menstrual cycles, the following symptoms must be 
present in the final week before the onset of menses, start to improve within a 
few days after the onset of menses, and become minimal or absent in the 
week post-menses. At least one of the symptoms must be either (1.), (2.), 
(3.), or (4.) below and the individual must experience at least five total 
symptoms: 
 
(1.) marked affective lability (e.g., mood swings; feeling  suddenly sad or 
tearful or increased sensitivity to rejection) 
(2.) marked irritability or anger or increased interpersonal conflicts 
(3.) marked depressed mood, feelings of hopelessness, or self-deprecating 
thoughts 
(4.) marked anxiety, tension, feelings of being "keyed up" or "on edge" 
(5.) decreased interest in usual activities (e.g., work, school, friends, 
hobbies) 
(6.) subjective sense of difficulty in concentration 
(7.) lethargy, easy fatigability, or marked lack of energy 
(8.) marked change in appetite, overeating, or specific food cravings 
(9.) hypersomnia or insomnia 
(10.) a sense of being overwhelmed or out of control 
(11.) physical symptoms such as breast tenderness or swelling, joint or 
muscle pain, a sensation of “bloating,” weight gain 
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B. The symptoms are associated with clinically significant distress or 
interferences with work, school, usual social activities or relationships with 
others (e.g. avoidance of social activities, decreased productivity and 
efficiency at work, school or home) 
C. The disturbance is not merely an exacerbation of the symptoms of another 
disorder, such as Major Depressive Disorder, Panic Disorder, Dysthymic 
Disorder, or a Personality Disorder (although it may co-occur with any of 
these disorders). 
D. Criteria A should be confirmed by prospective daily ratings during at least two 
symptomatic cycles. (The diagnosis may be made provisionally prior to this 
confirmation). 
E. The symptoms are not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance 
(e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication or other treatment) or another medical 
condition (e.g., hyperthyroidism). 
 
1.5.2 Rationale for the inclusion of PMDD in DSM 5  
 
PMDD was added in the appendix of DSM-IV (APA 1994). This means that 
PMDD was not given full status as a mental disorder but was located in the 
appendix for further studies to consider whether some women with premenstrual 
symptoms suffer so seriously that their symptoms should be considered a 
disease. Scientific evidence was to be provided in order to establish whether 
PMDD is a disease. At present the DSM 5 task force has proposed that PMDD 
should be categorized as a psychiatric disorder. They summarize the rationale for 
this proposed change stating that: “While the inclusion of criteria in the Appendix 
of DSM-III-R and DSM-IV facilitated research, the workgroup felt that information 
on the diagnosis, treatment and validators of the disorder had matured to the 
point that it would qualify as a category in DSM V” (DSM 5, APA, in press, 
www.dsm5.org). However, feminist scholars (e.g., Chrisler & Caplan 2002) have 
proposed that the DSM is not based on scientific research and argue against the 
inclusion of PMDD in DSM 5. I will now explore some of these criticisms and 
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summarize the methodological problems inherent in the research on 
premenstrual changes. 
  
1.6 Specific methodological, theoretical and empirical critiques of the 
evidence-base  
 
1.6.1 Methodological Issues 
 
Some psychologists, feminist theorists and researchers have argued that the 
classification of premenstrual distress as PMS and PMDD has been supported 
with little scientific evidence (e.g. Caplan et al., 1992). There are concerns that 
the literature on PMS (which includes PMDD) is plagued with methodological 
problems (e.g. Gallant & Hamilton 1998; Parlee 1973)1. Generally, previous 
research studies have provided inconsistent prevalence rates of PMS and 
PMDD. Earlier studies rarely presented with an agreed definition of the condition, 
nor did the authors agree on how many symptoms need to be present or how 
severe the symptoms must be in order for it to be considered a disorder (Chrisler 
& Caplan 2002). Additionally, the definition of the premenstrual phase has been 
unclear, with some authors defining it as 5-7 days prior to the start of menses, 
others defining it as the entire luteal phase of 2 weeks prior to start of menses 
and yet others defining it as the first few days prior to menses or the entire 
menstrual phase (Chrisler 2001).  
 
Parlee (1973) noted various general methodological flaws inherent in the 
menstrual cycle research up until the 1970s. The main criticism reported by 
Parlee (1973) has been the inability of most researchers to establish which phase 
of the menstrual cycle their participants are actually in whilst participating in the 
research. Most researchers have used the calendar method, where the 
participants are asked to remember the dates of their last period and then count 
ahead until they reach the premenstrual time frame to arrange testing. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Some	  of	  the	  research	  findings	  presented	  from	  10-­‐40	  years	  ago	  have	  been	  reported	  in	  the	  present	  time.	  The	  use	  of	  present	  tense	  emphasizes	  the	  continuing	  attitudes	  to	  menstruation	  and	  to	  the	  criticisms	  of	  menstrual	  research.	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method is often the least reliable method for two reasons. First, the method relies 
on the participant’s memory (which can be incorrect) of the dates of their last 
menstrual period, and secondly, inherent in the method is the assumption that all 
menstrual cycles are the same length (Parlee 1973). Researchers have 
established that the “28-day” menstrual cycle can often vary in length between 
women and from time to time in an individual woman (e.g. Treloar et al., 1967) 
and that life stress (including social and school or work-related anxiety) can alter 
menstrual cycle length and/or suppress ovulation (Nagata et al., 1986). Other 
flaws previously reported include the frequent use of retrospective measures of 
symptoms (which also rely on memory), the focus on negative changes, the 
frequent absence of control groups, the exclusion of males as controls, and 
failing to screen participants for other medical and psychiatric disorders that may 
influence their symptom profiles (Parlee 1974). Others have noted that the poor 
research on premenstrual changes reflect tacit assumptions about the negative 
influence of the menstrual cycle on female functioning (Gallant & Hamilton 1998). 
For example, in the academic literature, there are no mention of positive 
premenstrual changes that are often reported by women, including bursts of 
energy and activity, increased creativity, increased sex drive, and feelings of 
affection (Chrisler et al., 1994; Lee 2002). This absence of positive changes is 
likely to perpetuate the negative associations of menstruation (Chrisler & Caplan 
2002).  
 
In view of the above methodological problems inherent in the research literature 
on PMS, many researchers have questioned whether premenstrual distress, 
labelled as PMDD, should be included in the DSM. Indeed, when the inclusion 
was first proposed in the 1980s, there was an outpouring of protests from the 
feminist community in general and from many individual members of the APA, 
who objected to the diagnosis on either political or scientific grounds (Kutchins & 
Kirk 1997; Chrisler & Caplan 2002). I will now consider some of these arguments.  
 
1.6.2 DSM and the problems of Reliability and Validity 
Since the first edition of DSM in 1952, the manual had gone through four major 
revisions, each time adding to the number of mental disorders and eliminating 
	   17	  
those no longer thought to be mental disorders. The removal of mental disorders 
is problematic because it indicates that the classification of mental disorders may 
not be evidenced based since if it were supported by evidence, there would be no 
need to remove them from the manual. However, this is not the only problem –
the DSM has been continuously adding new categories that may not be 
supported by evidence. DSM-I (APA 1952) included 106 mental disorders. Nearly 
forty years later, DSM-IV (APA 1994) was published and had included 374 
categories of mental disorders. At present, this number is expected to rise in the 
upcoming DSM 5 (APA in press). With each edition, mental disorders have been 
created, eliminated, or radically defined, and these changes have been presented 
as scientifically guided, reliable and valid (Kutchins & Kirk 1997).  
The most essential scientific criticism of DSM concerns the validity and reliability 
of its diagnostic categories (Kutchins & Kirk 1997). This refers, roughly, to 
whether mental disorders are actually real conditions in people in the real world, 
and whether they can be consistently identified by its diagnostic criteria (Kutchins 
& Kirk 1997). Indeed, the primary purpose of DSM classification systems is to 
enhance diagnostic agreements and allow professionals the ability to distinguish 
mental disorders from other human problems. This standard of reliability, 
however, has not been reported in the DSM. In 1973, Rosenhan’s classic study 
‘on being sane in insane places’ raised serious concerns about the reliability 
issue by revealing that mental health professionals were not able to distinguish 
the sane from the insane. Twenty years later, Kutchins and Kirk (1997: 53) argue 
that there is still no ‘credible evidence that any version of the manual has greatly 
increased its reliability beyond the previous versions’. Zimmerman (1988) points 
out that the revisions of the manual came so quickly that it actually impeded the 
use of scientific findings to improve the manual. This must imply that the changes 
cannot have been informed by relevant scientific research. Zimmerman (1988) 
argued that the changes in each revision were presented as matter-of-fact and 
almost completely absent were any attempts to justify the changes on the basis 
of scientific evidence. He argued that the final product, which incorporated 
hundreds of minor and major changes, was never directly tied through citations to 
research articles, making it difficult to verify or dispute the claims of science-at-
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work. Zimmerman (1988) concluded that the scientific progress of the manual is 
an illusion.  
Critics have also questioned the validity of mental disorders, asking whether 
mental disorders are real conditions or not. For instance, in the 1970s, gay 
activists challenged the inclusion of homosexuality in the manual on the grounds 
that there was a lack of scientific evidence to suggest that homosexuality was a 
mental disorder (Kutchins & Kirk 1997). Indeed, homosexuality was removed 
from the manual in DSM-III (APA 1980) but its removal had illustrated that 
political pressure, rather than scientific evidence, can change the contents of the 
manual. Around the same time, other dissenters were critiquing the manual for 
medicalising everyday problems. Kutchins and Kirk (1997) have commented that 
the inclusion criteria for many mental disorders listed in the manual include 
everyday behaviours, such as not being able to sleep, lacking sexual interest, 
worrying, feeling blue, frustrated, experiencing difficulty in concentrating, being 
restlessness and so on. Others have suggested that the DSM transforms normal 
expectable response to distressing events into illness e.g. the distress 
experienced by child who is abused can be labelled as ‘reactive attachment 
disorder’ (Rapley, Moncrieff & Dillon 2011). Rapley, Moncrieff and Dillon (2011) 
have argued that the pathologization of the individual results in the contexts that 
are responsible for causing distress to be neglected. Studies have continuously 
found that exposure to many forms of social, moral and political problems such 
as poverty, discrimination, racism, and trauma play a major role in creating 
emotional distress (Bentall 2003; Read et al., 2001). Many feminist writers have 
also criticized the DSM for neglecting the contexts that give rise to emotional 
distress in women. Some feminist writers have gone further to suggest that the 
DSM categories and those involved in creating the DSM manual are 
discriminatory towards women (e.g. Caplan 1995).  
1.6.3 DSM and Gender-Bias  	  
Many feminist theorists have stressed that the DSM-IV and its predecessors is 
biased towards women (e.g. Caplan 1991, 1995). Over the years, feminists have 
fought against the inclusion of various categories on the grounds that it would 
unreasonably label women as mad. In the 1980s, following from APA’s proposal 
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to include three new psychiatric disorders, namely, paraphilic rapism, masochistic 
personality disorder and PMDD in DSM-III-R (APA 1987), feminist theorists 
confronted the APA on the grounds that these proposed categories were not 
scientifically objective and were discriminatory towards women (Kutchins & Kirk 
1989). APA faced pressures from the organized oppositions, protests, petitions, 
and letters summarizing the insubstantial evidence-base for the categories (e.g. 
Caplan 1987). After much deliberation, the APA did not fully approve any of the 
categories but placed them in the appendix for further studies. This did not leave 
the feminist critics at ease knowing that someone can propose moving them into 
the main part of the manual (Caplan 1987). Such doubts amongst feminists were 
not unreasonable since PMDD is now being proposed for inclusion in DSM 5. 
Caplan’s (1995) experiences as a consultant to two DSM-IV subcommittees has 
led her to argue that science does not necessarily play a part when it comes to 
the classification of mental disorders. She emphasized the lack of scientific 
objectivity in many of DSM’s decision-making process and concluded that the 
discussions surrounding what is normal and what is abnormal had more to do 
with the subjective (male) opinions of committee members than scientific 
evidence.  
 
Some feminists believe that science has been employed to construct masculinity 
and femininity in a way that is in the interests of white, middle-class men (Malson 
1998). Fee (1981 in Malson 1998: 35) suggests that the scientific research often 
posits ‘rational man’ as producing objective knowledge of the natural world. This 
ideology requires the tacit assumption that the characteristics of a ‘rational man’ 
are actually characteristics of males (Fee 1981 in Malson 1998: 35). In this way, 
scientific community has, whether purposely or unintentionally, excluded the 
possibility that women could be the ‘agents of knowledge’ (Harding 1987 in 
Malson 1998: 35). Rather, science has produced ‘evidence’ that women are 
naturally suited to domesticity and mothering (Jordanova 1989 in Malson 1998: 
36), are less intelligent than men (Sayers 1982 in Malson 1998: 36), and are 
more prone to sickness (Ehrenreich & English 1974) and mental instability 
(Ussher 1991). Science has positioned the woman as the ‘Other’ of man, and 
situated femininity with nature, superstition and emotion (Jordanova 1989 in 
Malson 1998: 36; Ussher 1991). This ‘Othering’ allow women to be marginalized 
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and inevitably pathologized. Indeed, the World Health Organization (WHO, 2012) 
reported that doctors were more likely to diagnose depression in women 
compared with men even when they have identical symptoms as measured by 
scores on standardized measures of depression. Similar findings have been 
reported for PMDD (Caplan et al., 1992).  
 
Caplan et al., (1992) argue that the same emotional displays that are considered 
normal in men are seen as a mental disorder in women. Feminists have been 
particularly concerned with why DSM developers have not identified parallel 
diagnoses of PMDD for men when there is evidence to suggest that men also 
experience ‘hormonally’ based mood or behavior changes (Caplan et al., 1992; 
McFarlane & Williams 1994). Caplan et al., (1992) asks why women’s changes in 
moods due to hormonal changes are considered psychiatric abnormalities. 
Goodman (1986) contends that women’s premenstrual behaviour is not abnormal 
by comparison with men’s behaviour. Martin (1987) and Taylor (1988) argue that 
there is a double standard – men’s anger may be accepted and even expected 
as part of men’s nature but women’s anger maybe unacceptable and labelled as 
PMS/PMDD with no attempt made to determine its source. Chrisler and Caplan 
(2002) and others have pointed out that, although PMS is often treated as a joke 
in popular culture (frequently by female comedians), PMDD as an alleged mental 
illness will result in increased bias and discrimination against women (e.g. Caplan 
et al., 1992; Figert 1996; Nash & Chrisler 1997; Tavris 1992). Women with a 
diagnosis of PMDD in their medical records may be seen as unfit mothers in child 
custody cases or as unsupportable candidates for political office (Tavris 1992). 
As a result of the diagnosis, society as a whole may be more willing to see 
women’s behaviour as pathological, rather than socially constructed.  
  
1.7 PMDD is socially constructed  
There are several lines of evidence to suggest that the concept of PMDD is 
socially constructed. After writing extensively about the multitude of problems 
plaguing the PMS research, Parlee (1973) has concluded that the construct of 
PMS is not supported by scientific evidence. However, the fact that the medical 
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establishment treats PMDD as a legitimate disease category despite no scientific 
evidence may suggest that a ‘shared cultural knowledge, as opposed to scientific 
facts’ may be informing the researcher’s understandings PMDD (Rodin 1992: 52). 
This cultural knowledge regards the female reproductive system responsible for 
the negative changes in women’s behaviour/feelings. This belief is particularly 
dominant in the Western parts of the world. In Eastern cultures such as Hong 
Kong and China, women report premenstrual water retention, pain, fatigue, 
increased sensitivity to cold, but rarely report negative premenstrual mood 
(Chang et al., 1995; Yu et al., 1996). In these cultures, the changes are also 
accepted as normal part of daily existence rather than a disorder of some sort 
(Epstein 1995). This has led some to conclude that PMS is a culture bound 
syndrome (Chrisler & Johnston-Robledo 2002). Chrisler and Caplan (2002) argue 
that women in any part of the world may experience similar premenstrual 
changes (e.g. tension, sadness, irritability, or water retention), but only in 
Western societies are women encouraged to think that their premenstrual 
emotional state is abnormal and in need of professional help.  
 
Chrisler and Caplan (2002) suggest that in Western cultures there is a belief that 
the menstruating woman is irrational or overly emotional. Such beliefs are 
depicted in magazines, films, television shows, calendars, songs, self-help books, 
and advertising (Chrisler & Levy 1990). Chrisler and Levy (1990) found that 
popular articles in the media present a picture of a ‘menstrual monster’. These 
ideas are easily absorbed into a kind of folk wisdom – things ‘everyone knows’ 
about women (Chrisler & Johnston-Robledo 2002). Implicit in these beliefs and 
stereotypes are the ideas about how women should feel and behave (Markens 
1996). For instance, the social construction of femininity tells us that good women 
are always soft-spoken, patient, receptive, nurturing, kind, and if she is anything 
but that, she and her family are quick to think something is wrong (Caplan 1995). 
Caplan (1995) believes that the classification of PMDD as a psychiatric disorder 
covers up the real reasons of women's distress and anger that might be the result 
of her position in society, relationship difficulties or life stress. There is evidence 
to suggest that relational, social, economic, cultural and structural factors can 
contribute to both the experience and perception of premenstrual changes (e.g. 
Ussher & Perz 2008). Markens (1996) argue that the gendered divisions of labor 
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(i.e. the demands of work and home life) can contribute to the physiological 
manifestation of symptoms (e.g. stress, anger, and fatigue). Markens (1996) 
argues that women’s lives are stressful and highly demanding and if she 
complains, the label of PMDD can function to allow her genuine grievance to be 
ignored. 
 
Another line of evidence to suggest that PMDD is socially constructed comes 
from socio-political studies (Laws et al., 1985; Martin 1987). These studies show 
that the concept of PMS emerged at a time when women’s status and role in the 
West were changing and women were beginning to contest the inequalities of 
power and privilege (Martin 1987). Chrisler and Caplan (2002) argue that the 
belief that women are erratic and unreliable premenstrually serves to restrict 
woman's access to equal opportunities and prevent them from being employed in 
positions of responsibility, such as pilots (Parlee 1973) physicians and presidents 
(Figert 2005).  




I began highlighting that the scientific study of menstruation emerged during the 
latter part of nineteenth century when feminists were demanding for access to 
higher education, higher professions and vote for women. Medical professionals 
formed a negative view of menstruation during this time, which continued into the 
twentieth century. I then presented the scientific and academic literature on 
premenstrual changes that ultimately explained premenstrual distress in 
biomedical terms. Thereafter, I wrote about the evolution of PMDD within the 
DSM and provided the scientific rationale that the DSM 5 had used to include 
PMDD in the manual. I briefly mentioned that feminist scholars have argued 
against the inclusion of PMDD in DSM 5 on the basis of methodological, 
theoretical and empirical critiques of the evidence-base. In reference to PMDD, 
some feminists (e.g. Caplan et al., 1992) have argued that the same emotional 
displays that are seen as a mental disorder in women are considered normal in 
men. And finally, I considered the evidence that women’s daily experiences of 
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work and responsibilities can influence the menstrual cycle and exacerbate the 
premenstrual distress felt. Much of the critique above has led me to believe that 
the concept of PMDD is socially constructed, flawed and grounded in a historical 
tradition of problematizing menstruation. This study was warranted by the lack of 
evidence and justification for medicalising premenstrual experiences in the DSM. 
I argue that the inclusion of PMDD in the DSM 5 will have serious negative 
consequences for women. The way we construct menstruation or aspects of the 
menstrual cycle has effect on the way we view women and the way we treat 
them. For these reasons, the medicalisation of premenstrual changes must be 
critically examined and if evidence indicates that the concept of PMDD is not 
valid, then I strongly recommend that PMDD be excluded entirely from DSM 5. 
 
1.8.2 Rationale for Research  
 
The primary aim of the project was to explore how psychiatric and psychological 
literature has constructed premenstrual changes and how the concept of PMDD 
developed. I took a genealogical approach to understand the construction of 
PMDD within the context of the DSM. I attempted to assess whether the inclusion 
of premenstrual distress as a psychiatric disorder within the DSM is scientifically 
valid and evidenced based. By examining the psychiatric and psychological 
literature of the twentieth century, I aim to find out how premenstrual changes 
have developed into a psychiatric disorder. In doing so, four research questions 
were articulated in this study.  
 
1.8.3 Research Questions  
 
Main Research questions: 
 
• How do psychological and psychiatric literatures construct premenstrual 
changes?’  
• Under what circumstances are women’s premenstrual changes rendered 
problematic and what professional discourses render these problems 
intelligible? 
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Secondary research questions: 
 
• What discursive and regulatory practices warrant the constructions of 
premenstrual changes as a psychiatric disorder?  
• What subject positions are enabled and what are the implications for 
action of these subject positions?  
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CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY 
 
This present study utilised two qualitative methodologies to examine the way 
psychological and psychiatric literature has influenced the categorization of 
premenstrual changes in the DSM. The study employed a Foucauldian Discourse 
Analysis methodology to analyse texts within the literature. The study also 
employed a Foucauldian Genealogy to explore the discursive and non-discursive 
practices that have influenced our present understanding of premenstrual 




2.1.1 Social Constructionism 
 
Epistemology is the study of the theory of knowledge, concerned with what 
knowledge is, where knowledge comes from, and whether we know any 
knowledge at all. Social constructionism assumes a relativist epistemology (Burr 
2003) and is in direct opposition to the realist epistemology often associated with 
the scientific and experimental methodologies. Social constructionism draws 
attention to the fact that human knowledge, experience and perception is bound 
by time and culture, and is mediated historically, culturally and linguistically 
(Gergen 1985; Burr 2003). Social constructionism does not believe in an 
objective reality ‘out there’, instead it perceives language to be central to the way 
we view or construct the world, such that, ‘reality’ becomes constructed through 
language rather existing outside of it. Harper (2011) described social 
constructionism as: 
 
“[epistemologically] relativist in a number of ways: its scepticism about a 
direct relationship between accounts and reality; and its assumption that 
we do not make direct contact with the world but, rather, our experience 
of it is mediated through culturally shared concepts – in other words 
language shapes our experience of reality” (Harper 2011: 91).  
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Consequently, social constructionist approaches challenge mainstream 
psychological approaches to ‘health’ and ‘illness’ on the grounds that the 
meaning of ‘health’ and ‘illness’ are constructed within and sustained by social 
practices (Burr 1995). Social constructionist perspectives are concerned with 
identifying the various ways phenomena (e.g. premenstrual changes) are 
constructed through discourses that are available in a culture and exploring the 
implications of those constructions on people who are affected by them (Harper 
2011). The term ‘discourse’ refers to a set of shared cultural beliefs and 
practices, which are utilized in everyday life in order to construct meaning and 
interpretation about the world (Parker 1992).  
 
However, adopting a relativist social constructionist perspective and focusing 
specifically on language and seeing nothing beyond texts is problematic. One of 
the main problems in arguing that ‘things’ exist entirely at a discursive or at a 
linguistic level is that we are implicitly denying the influence of biology and the 
material aspects of people’s lives (Ussher 2002). Ussher (2002) comments that 
positioning the body as irrelevant in the aetiology and meaning of say, emotional 
distress, can deny the ‘reality’ of the distress and lead to the conceptualisation of 
the distress as being ‘all in the mind’. Ussher (2002) argues that viewing distress 
as created by negative social constructions or discourses is not helpful to all 
persons who seek treatment for such distress and perceive it to have a significant 
influence on their lives. Feminist psychologists such as Ussher (2002) and 
Stoppard (2000) have argued that traditional psychology has tended to adopt a 
solely materialist standpoint, thus serving to negate discursive aspects of 
experience, whilst many discursive accounts have tended to negate the material 
aspects of life. As a result of this challenge, Ussher (2002) and Stoppard (2000) 
have developed models for understanding women’s emotional distress that 
attempt to incorporate both the material and discursive aspects of distress 
without privileging one over the other. In the next section, I will outline two 
specific and compatible approaches that have influenced my research: critical 
realism and material-discursive approach. 
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2.1.2 Critical Realism 	  
Researchers taking the critical realist position support the social constructionist 
assumption that ‘language is understood as constructing our social realities’ 
(Sims-Schouten, Riley & Willig 2007: 102). However this does not mean that the 
events that take place outside of language are denied. Researchers taking a 
critical realist position also acknowledge the existence of broader social, historical 
and cultural events and the effects these events may have on individuals. In 
essence, critical realism includes both dimensions of human existence, the ‘real 
or non-discursive (i.e. material structures that exist independently of our 
understanding of them)’ and the ‘discursive (i.e. discursive resources and 
practices that are available to make sense of human experience)’ (Sims-
Schouten, Riley & Willig 2007: 103). Researchers taking a critical realist 
approach to their work will merge both the bio-medical and psycho-social aspects 
of experience, as well as acknowledge the cultural and historical context in which 
individuals are positioned, and in which meaning about experience is created 
(Ussher 2002). 
2.1.3 A Material-Discursive Approach 
 
A material-discursive approach, informed by feminist thinking, places a specific 
emphasis on gender at both a material and a discursive level. The material-
discursive position raises the issue that if we see emotional distress as wholly 
constructed and only discursive, we greatly limit our ability to acknowledge and 
be responsive to the undeniable presence of suffering in the lives of those who 
experience emotional distress. Feminist theorists such as Ussher (2002) and 
Stoppard (2000) have argued for the importance of combining biological, 
psychological, social, and discursive factors in understanding women’s emotional 
distress. They argue that all of these factors are intertwined and should not 
override or marginalise all other possible explanations for understanding distress. 
Moreover, they argue that the body should not be seen as solely physical and 
independent of social circumstances. A key feminist concern has been that 
mainstream psychological models tend to conceptualize the female body solely in 
biological terms and as a result medicalize women’s bodies and women’s 
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distress. Stoppard (2000) suggests that the body is both naturally and culturally 
produced rather than being a timeless, natural organism. The body is immersed 
in culture and it is through the body, amongst other ways, that women can 
engage in the practices of femininity. Stoppard (2000: 92) writes: ‘A key idea in 
material-discursive approaches to understanding depression [or any other 
distress] in women is that under certain circumstances engaging in practices of 
femininity (i.e. doing activities that signify a ‘good woman’), can exhaust a 
women’s body, while undermining her morale and sense of wellbeing…one way 
of understanding depression is as the embodied experiences which occur in 
conjunction with a woman’s efforts to achieve the socially constructed ideal of a 
good woman’.  
 
2.2 Foucauldian Discourse Analysis 
 
The study set out to examine the ways in which psychological and psychiatric 
literature has influenced the construction of premenstrual changes. The study 
employed a Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) methodology to analyse texts 
within the psychological and psychiatric literature. This approach to analysis is 
informed by a critical realist epistemology and offers a particular critical approach 
to researching premenstrual changes by considering wider societal contexts.  
FDA is a variant of Discourse Analysis and is influenced by the writings of Michel 
Foucault (1926-1984). FDA is concerned with the role language plays in the 
construction of discourses and the ‘constitution of social and psychological life’ 
(Willig 2008: 112). The function of language goes ‘beyond the immediate 
contexts’ (Willig 2008: 113) of the words spoken by people and makes ‘new 
sectors of reality thinkable and practicable’ (Rose 1990 in Parker et al., 1995: 59). 
Language enables people to get things done, perform certain functions or serve 
certain interests (Edwards & Potter 1992). For Foucault (1972 in Malson 1998: 
25) language consists of a variety of different historically specific discourses. 
Each discourse or construction makes available certain ways-of-seeing the world 
and certain ways-of-being in the world (Willig 2008). From a Foucauldian point of 
view, discourses facilitate and limit, enable and constrain what can be said, by 
whom, where and when (Parker 1992). In this way ‘discourses regulate our 
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knowledge of the world’ and make certain ‘realities’ seem more reasonable than 
others (Burr 2003: 67). 
 
2.2.1 Discourse, Knowledge and Power  
 
Burr (2003) draws on Foucault’s ideas on the relationship between discourse, 
knowledge and power to suggest that if ‘discourses regulate our knowledge of the 
world’, and if these shared knowledge and understandings inform our social 
practices then it becomes clear that ‘there is an intimate relationship between 
discourse, knowledge and power’ (Burr 2003: 67). Foucault was concerned with 
this relationship and emphasized that ‘power and knowledge directly imply one 
another’ (Foucault 1979: 27). For Foucault, all discourses are about power, and it 
is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined. Burr (2003: 67-68) notes 
that some constructions or discourses have a ‘greater tendency to be seen as 
common sense or more truthful than others’. An example of this could be seen in 
contemporary society where the knowledge of our world provided by science and 
medicine have more credibility and are viewed as more likely versions of the truth 
than versions that are constructed outside of science and medicine such as 
religion. From a Foucauldian point of view, the particular view of the world 
prevailing in a culture at any one time is intimately bound up with power (Burr 
2003).  
 
2.2.2 Discourse and Subjectivity 
 
From a Foucauldian perspective, discourses produce subject positions and 
identities, which, when taken up, have implications for subjectivity and experience 
(Foucault 1972 in Malson 1998: 26). In contemporary society the professions of 
psychology, psychotherapy and psychiatry play a central role in occupying certain 
types of knowledge that give them permission to regulate people who are 
deemed mentally unfit (Rose 1985). Discourses produced in institutional sites 
produce knowledge that positions people in a particular category and define how 
they should be treated. Thus, discourses as social practices have ‘real effects’, 
legitimizing particular practices, constituting particular ‘truths’ about ‘reality’ and 
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positioning and constituting people as, for example, sane or insane (Walkerdine 
1986 in Malson 1998: 26).  
 
2.2.3 Power and Resistance 
 
Willig (2008) notes that some discourses are so entrenched and powerful and 
have become ‘common sense’ to such an extent that is very difficult to see how 
we may challenge them. However, since FDA assumes that all forms of 
knowledge and reality are socially constructed through language, discourse and 
discursive practices, no version of the world remains dominant eternally because 
it is in the nature of language that alternative constructions or ‘counter-discourse’ 
can emerge (Willig 2008). An analysis using FDA can make visible the power 
effects of particular discourses, discover how they have changed over time, and 
allow for the exploration of the ways social, physical and economic changes have 
provided the breeding ground for their emergence2. Foucault (1969 in Burr 2003: 
78) points out that if we can understand the social conditions that have led to our 
current ways of understanding ourselves, we can begin to question their 
legitimacy and resist and dislodge them from their position as truth.  
 
2.3 Foucauldian Genealogy 
 
The current research employed a Foucauldian genealogy as a methodology to 
explore the discursive and non-discursive practices that have influenced our 
present knowledge of premenstrual changes in the literature surrounding the 
DSM. Foucault’s use of genealogy as a methodology can be seen as a 
development of concepts used by Nietzsche in ‘On the Genealogy of Morals’ 
(1887). Foucault described genealogy using one of Nietzsche’s well-known 
metaphors that describes a past that is neither black (i.e. totally unknown) nor 
white (i.e. transparent), but something in between (gray), that is, ambiguous and 
uncertain (Foucault 1977). The ideas that captured his attention were Nietzsche’s 
rejection of the notion of the absolute truth. A genealogical approach assumes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Foucault’s Archaeology of knowledge entailed this tracing back to uncover the 
conditions, which allowed certain discourses and knowledge to emerge. 
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that certain taken-for-granted truths, such as scientific truths and ‘facts’, are 
historical constructs that have emerged out of social and political agendas. I will 
now highlight some key principles of a genealogy. 
         
2.3.1 History is not linear  
 
Traditional history is linear in that it moves on a single direction concerned with 
beginning and ending. Traditional history looks for origins and usually reinforces 
the idea of progress. Foucauldian genealogy challenges this idea of origins in our 
past and does not view history as a linear progress3. In his 1977 essay 
‘Nietzsche, genealogy, history’, Foucault wrote that Nietzsche challenged the 
pursuit of origins because the idea of origins assumes the ‘existence of immobile 
forms that precede the external world of accident and succession’ (Foucault 
1977: 142). Foucault writes that a genealogy is used ‘to identify the accidents, the 
minute deviation – or conversely, the complete reversals – the errors, the false 
appraisals, the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to 
exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being does not lie at the 
root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents’ (Foucault 
1977: 81). Tamboukou (1999: 203) writes that, ‘instead of seeing history as a 
continuous development of an ideal schema, genealogy is oriented to 
discontinuities … disruptions, uneven and haphazard processes of dispersions, 
that call into question the supposed linear evolution of history’. Foucault's 
genealogy seeks to find out the processes that lead to social phenomena, not the 
cause. It is not interested in explaining where things came from but how they 
were discursively constituted i.e. how their meaning came about.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  This	  research	  adheres	  to	  Foucault’s	  principle	  of	  the	  non-­‐linearity	  of	  history	  though	  a	  chronological	  development	  has	  been	  used	  as	  a	  presentational	  device	  for	  the	  analysis.	  The	  non-­‐linearity	  of	  emergence	  is	  emphasized	  throughout	  the	  analysis	  to	  reflect	  how	  different	  constructions	  of	  premenstrual	  distress	  have	  emerged	  since	  the	  publication	  of	  DSM	  in	  1952	  to	  the	  present	  time.	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2.3.2 There is no ‘truth’ 
 
Foucault (1977) is influenced by a key Nietzschean insight that truth cannot be 
separated from the procedures of its production. Foucauldian genealogy attempts 
to question taken for granted contemporary concepts and practices by looking at 
the conditions which gave rise to them (Foucault 1977). Foucauldian genealogy 
attempts to reveal that ‘facts’ are interpretations that are dependent on specific 
configurations of power, in other words, all 'truth' claims are influenced by power 
(Foucault 1977). For Foucault, the history as we know it has undergone constant 
editing and reediting by numerous and powerful individuals with a multitude of 
agendas, but for an end viewer, it appears like a solid fact. Merely looking at 
history does not expose the broad collaboration and the many fragmented 
historical steps that went into the creation of history. Foucault insists that ‘A 
characteristic of history is to be without choice… nothing must escape it, and 
more importantly, nothing must be excluded’ (Foucault 1977: 157). Foucault 
(1984: 76) writes that a genealogy ‘must define even those instances when they 
are absent, the moment when they remain unrealised’. In the search for descent 
it turns out that ‘truth or being does not lie at the root of what we know and what 
we are’ (Foucault 1984: 81). Foucault comments ‘since these things have been 
made, they can be unmade, as long as we know how it was that they were made’ 
(Foucault in Kelly 1994: 27). The unraveling of the ‘truths’ allows us to resist 
them.   
 
2.4 Methodological Rationale 
 
In the present study, a genealogy and FDA methodologies were employed to 
study premenstrual changes. Foucault’s concept of discourse provides a useful 
and theoretical space within to question critically the status of our current 
knowledges of premenstrual changes. This methodological approach will allow 
for the exploration of the ways social changes have provided the breeding ground 
for the emergence of PMS/PMDD. If we can understand the social conditions that 
have led to our current ways of understanding women’s premenstrual changes, 
we can begin to question their legitimacy and resist them. Alternative 
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conceptualisation of premenstrual changes can then offer different ways to 




2.5.1 Strategy for searching for and selecting material 	  
In order to answer the research questions, this study analysed the language 
(texts) used in psychological and psychiatric literature on premenstrual changes. 
In order to access materials related to premenstrual changes I conducted very 
broad searches, using the search term ‘premenstrual’ – which found results for 
‘premenstrual dysphoric disorder’, ‘premenstrual syndrome’ and ‘premenstrual 
tension’. The databases psycINFO, PubMed, ScienceDirect were used. The 
search periods reflected the DSM editions. Appendix 1 includes the full Database 
search results. Below is a summary of the search results: 
 
Table 1: Search Results for ‘Premenstrual’ in PsychINFO, ScienceDirect, and 
PubMed Databases.  
 




Pre DSM-5 2008 - 2013 302 2405 4873 7580 
Post DSM-IV 1994 - 1999 400 1539 720 5593 
Pre DSM-IV 1986 - 1993 652 1366 1021 3039 
Post DSMIII 1980 - 1985 167 513 476  1156 
Pre DSM-III 1974 - 1979 78 235 277  590 
Post DSM-II 1968 – 1973 35 101 202  338 
Pre DSM-II 1963 – 1968 21 120 177  318 
Post DSM-I 1952 - 1957 9 61 129 199 
Pre DSM-I 1947 - 1952 4 46 48  98 
Pre DSM 1800 - 1946 11 176 8  195 
 
Due to the vast amount of data on premenstrual changes, inclusion and exclusion 
criteria were applied to all studies retrieved by the searches. The decision to 
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include or exclude studies was made by reading the title and abstract of each 
article. Following this, the most cited / relevant articles (from database 
ratings/citations) were chosen but not exceeding a total of 10 articles for each 
period. Then, these chosen articles were entered into google-scholar and most 
cited articles (as identified in google-scholar) were selected for analysis. A total of 
47 articles were entered for analysis (see Appendix 2). Below is a list of the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria that were used to identify these articles. 	  	  	  
2.5.2 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 	  
Inclusion Criteria 
• Research studies based on psychological and psychiatric literature that 
focus on the diagnosis, symptoms and etiology of PMDD/PMS/PMT 
• Research studies that were most cited or most relevant within the 
database as mentioned in the database. It is likely that the studies meeting 
this criteria have been influential in the construction of PMDD/PMS as a 
diagnostic category 
• Peer reviewed journal articles only 
• Research studies recognized in British and American Journals. 
• Research studies that focus on Western constructions of premenstrual 
changes 
• Research studies dated from the period of 1930-2012 
• Research studies that indicate the medicalisation of premenstrual changes 
• Literature reviews 
• Gynaecological research studies that implicate the female reproductive 
system in the etiology of PMDD  
 
Exclusion Criteria 
• Research from feminism, religion, sociology and anthropology literature 
• Treatment studies 
• Dissertations, Books, and Electronic collections 
• Studies focusing on premenstrual symptom screening tools 
• Research studies that only focus on the menstrual cycle rather than 
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premenstrual phase 
• Animal studies 
• Research studies that mention premenstrual changes superficially 
• Research studies that include other comorbid conditions e.g. anorexia, 
depression, anxiety 
• Single case studies 
• Research studies not peer reviewed or cited 
• Research studies that are not in English language 
 
2.5.4 Process of analysis 
 
See appendix 3 for full analytic steps and appendix 4 for an example of the initial 
analysis of the data. Throughout the analyses, four research questions were used 
to examine the data. These questions, outlined below, were consistently thought 
of when reading and analysing the data:   
 
1. How do psychological and psychiatric literatures construct premenstrual 
changes?’  
2. Under what circumstances are women’s premenstrual changes rendered 
problematic and what professional discourses render these problems 
intelligible? 
3. What discursive and regulatory practices warrant the constructions of 
premenstrual changes as a psychiatric disorder?  
4. What subject positions are enabled and what are the implications for 
action of these subject positions?  
2.5.5 Doing Foucauldian Discourse Analysis: 
 
Willig (2008: 115-117) wrote a chapter on how to conduct a FDA. The analysis 
applied the procedures described by Willig (2008). The procedure involved six 
steps outlined below.  
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1. The first stage of analysis involved the identification of the different ways in 
which the discursive object was constructed in the text. This part of the 
analysis was interested in how premenstrual changes were constructed.  
 
2. The second stage of analysis aimed to locate the various discursive 
constructions within wider discourses. For instance, the text may have 
drawn upon several different discourses when writing about premenstrual 
changes.  
 
3. The third stage of analysis involved asking several questions that were 
concerned with the action orientation of the text e.g. what is gained from 
constructing the object in this particular way? What is its function and how 
does it relate to other constructions produced in the text? What are various 
constructions of the discursive object capable of achieving within the text?  
 
4. The fourth stage was concerned with what subject positions the discursive 
object offer. In other words, discourse construct subjects as well as objects 
and, and as a result, make available positions within network of meaning 
that the author can take up (as well as place others within).  
 
5. The fifth stage was concerned with the relationship between discourse and 
practice. The analysis of discourse maps the possibilities for action 
contained within the discursive constructions identified in the text. It 
explores what can be said and done by constructing particular versions of 
the world and by positioning subjects within them in particular ways.  
 
6. The final stage in the analysis explored the relationship between discourse 
and subjectivity. Discourses make available certain ways-of-seeing the 
world and certain ways-of-being in the world. They construct social as well 
as psychological realities. This stage in the analysis traced the 
consequences of taking up various subject positions for the participants’ 
subjective experience (i.e. what can be felt, thought and experienced from 
within various subject positions).  
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2.5.6 Doing a Genealogy 
 
In none of his writing, lectures or interviews did Foucault set out a procedure of 
specific techniques for carrying out genealogical analysis. Foucault insisted on 
not following any specific methodology to do a genealogy. All those who have 
been inspired by Foucault’s genealogy have made some attempts to make the 
genealogical method usable, whilst acknowledging that there is no one correct 
way of conducting a genealogical analysis. A genealogical analysis in the present 
study was conducted according to procedures described by Williams (2005) and 
Tamboukou (1999). This involved a number of steps that are outlined below. 
  
1. The first step in doing a genealogy was to identify an area of study 
designated the ‘problem’, then, define the problem as the dispositif. A 
dispositif refers to ‘discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory 
decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, 
philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions’. 
 
2. The second step was to put together the different elements of ‘discursive 
and non discursive’ concerned with the area of study. Here is the 
beginning of a major interrogation of what has been accepted as the 
‘truth’.  
 
3. The third step was to trace the historical developments and emergences of 
the ‘problem’, tracing their repetition, recurrence or even disappearance in 
relation to the time period.  
 
4. The last stage was the opening up of future possibilities as a direct result 
of the analysis of the ‘problem’, both for society and for the subject.   
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CHAPTER THREE: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter is organised within a structure that broadly sets out a chronological 
developmental of the concept of PMS and PMDD. The analysis will 
predominantly focus on mainstream psychiatric and psychological literature from 
the 1930s to the present. Some attention will be given to the nineteenth century 
literature on menstruation. The analysis will focus on the medicalisation of 
premenstrual changes that had resulted in the categorisation of PMDD in the 
DSM. I have structured my analysis according to each edition of the DSM, 
reporting on the most influential studies of that period. The first part of the 
analysis aims to provide an overview of the general discourse on PMS/PMDD. 
Extracts from the data will be used to demonstrate how constructions are made 
possible and what effects the constructions have on practice and subject 
positions. Subsequently, I will answer the research questions. Additionally, some 
of the multiple contingencies in the history such as the political circumstances, 
which often go unmentioned in mainstream accounts, will be highlighted. I 
conclude with a discussion of the significance of my findings.  
 
3.1 Current Context of PMDD  
 
PMDD was added in the appendix of DSM-III-R and DSM-IV (APA 1987, 1994). 
This means that PMDD was not given full status as a mental disorder but was 
located in the appendix for further studies. Since the 1980s psychiatry led most of 
the biomedical research on premenstrual distress and concluded that there is 
strong evidence to suggest that PMDD is a distinct disease. At present the DSM 
5 task force has proposed that PMDD should be included in the DSM 5 as distinct 
psychiatric disorder. I will now analyse some of the leading studies that may have 
influenced the task force’s proposal to include PMDD in DSM 5 as a mental 
disorder. The analysis was primarily focused on the development of the modern 
diagnostic formulation of PMDD.   
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3.2 The emergence of premenstrual tension in the twentieth century 
 
3.2.1 Constructing premenstrual tension as a hormonal disorder  
 
The earlier parts of the twentieth century marked a significant shift towards the 
medicalisation of premenstrual distress. The ‘discovery’ of the female sex 
hormones in the 1920s and the emergence of ‘premenstrual tension’ in the 1930s 
influenced the medicalisation of premenstrual distress for many decades to 
follow. The ‘discovery’ is the predecessor of the DSM, intended to provide 
evidence for a firm ‘scientific’ development of premenstrual distress. To the 
present day, the breakthrough of this period is used to support the specific 
psychiatric formulation and diagnosis of PMDD. Though the DSM is the main 
item of interest in the present study, the emergence of ‘premenstrual tension’ is 
important to investigate for it is the foundation of the medicalisation of 
premenstrual distress.  
 
The analysis of the literature published during the 1930s showed a transition 
between nineteenth century and twentieth century medical concerns about 
menstruation. In particular, there was a shift away from the uterine and ovarian 
discourses to a hormonal discourse. Throughout the 1920s there were 
speculations within the medical literature about the existence of one or more 
ovarian hormones. Estrogen was identified in the early 20s and progesterone 
was discovered in 1929 (Walker 1997). The ‘discoveries’ of these sex hormones 
had changed the way women’s wellbeing and illnesses were understood among 
physicians and researchers. In the twentieth century, the cause of women’s 
madness and illness was now being described as a female hormonal problem, 
rather than an ovarian problem. These ‘discoveries’ greatly influenced medical 
theories. It was no longer dysfunctional menstruation or dysfunctional ovulation 
which causes women to become mad, but dysfunctional hormones. Though there 
was no direct evidence to suggest that dysfunctional hormones caused women to 
become mad, the ‘discovery’ of the sex hormones was used to support the 
existing belief that abnormalities within the body causes women to become mad. 
In particular, the dysfunction of estrogen and progesterone were thought to cause 
madness in women, rather than difficult life experiences and circumstances. This 
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illustrates the way in which scientific discoveries and progress are recruited to 
support existing beliefs and prejudices about women’s wellbeing and madness.  
 
With the emergence of the hormonal discourse, the analysis found that the focus 
of research interest grew towards the premenstrual phase of the menstrual cycle. 
In 1931, American gynaecologist Robert Frank was the first medical clinician to 
define a set of symptoms related to the premenstrual phase of the menstrual 
cycle. Frank (1931) was influenced by the understanding of ovarian hormones 
and thought that the abnormalities of these hormones were responsible for the 
premenstrual symptoms that he witnessed in many women. He held the view that 
premenstrual symptoms were caused by increased estrogen production. He 
wrote: ‘blood concentration of estrogen is increased throughout the cycle… the 
urinary excretion is greatly diminished… this signifies a retention of estrogens in 
the blood stream, with resulting autonomic symptoms’ (Frank 1940: 95). Frank 
(1931) used the term ‘premenstrual tension’ (PMT) to describe this collection of 
symptoms occurring in the premenstrual week of the menstrual cycle. Frank’s 
(1931) description of the experiences of fifteen women is presented in the extract 
below:  
 
Extract 1: These patients complain of unrest, irritability, like jumping out of 
their skin and a desire to find relief by foolish and ill considered 
actions. Their personal suffering is intense and manifests itself in 
many reckless and sometimes reprehensible actions. Not only do 
they realise their own suffering, but they feel conscience-stricken 
toward their husbands and families, knowing well that they are 
unbearable in their attitude and reactions. Within an hour or two 
after the onset of the menstrual flow complete relief from both 
physical and mental tension occurs” (Frank 1931: 1054)  
 
In this extract, premenstrual changes have been constructed as a negative 
experience. Frank believed that premenstrual changes were a negative 
experience for all women. He assumed that all women experienced ‘varying 
degrees of discomfort, fatigability, irritability and lack concentration’ (Frank 1931: 
1053). But for some women, Frank portrayed the premenstrual phase as a period 
	   41	  
of both ‘physical and mental tension’, a time when women engage in ‘foolish and 
ill considered actions’ and have ‘attitudes and reactions’ that are ‘unbearable’ to 
their husbands and families. Franks categorization of women as suffers/non-
suffers enables the construction of PMT as an identifiable thing that is distinct 
from normal suffering that all women experience premenstrually. Frank (1931) 
attributed the symptomatology of PMT to the accumulations of the estrogen and 
as a result, he advocated treatment to attenuate estrogen production for PMT 
sufferers.  
 
The discourse on PMT presents a model of woman who can become out of 
control, irrational, reckless and irresponsible as a result of her hormonal changes. 
In Frank’s descriptions, there are numerous connotations of how women should 
and should not behave. To Frank, ‘reckless’, ‘foolish’ and ‘ill considered actions’ 
are behaviours that he believed are atypical for a woman, something that is only 
exhibited when her menstrual cycle hormones are imbalanced. This version of 
PMT women is far from the idealised female portrayed within the discourses of 
femininity. The ideal woman or the ‘good’ woman is someone who is pleasant to 
be with, in control, calm, kind, placid and undemanding of others. The ‘bad’ or the 
premenstrual-hormonally-imbalanced woman is one who is angry, demanding, 
and improperly behaved, such as the women depicted in Frank’s description. 
Moreover, PMT appears to have a moral purpose in Frank’s description. Frank 
has implicitly made several judgments about what is ‘acceptable’ and 
‘unacceptable’ behaviour for women e.g. ‘foolish and ill-considered’ 
‘reprehensible’ are unacceptable behaviours for women. Furthermore, Frank’s 
descriptions suggest that the main concern of PMT is with the impact it has on 
the husband and family rather than the woman herself (‘unbearable’ to her 
husband). As a result, Frank may be evaluating women and her premenstrual 
character solely in terms of her presumed role and function in society – to serve 
their husbands and be kind and acceptable to everyone around them. This 
construction ignores the impact of premenstrual distress on women themselves.  
 
Frank’s constructions may have negative consequences for women and for what 
is expected of her character and behaviour. For instance, these constructions of 
how women should behave may warrant people to gaze at the premenstrual 
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women and render her emotions as irrational and her behaviours as 
inappropriate. People may also ignore her expression of anger or irritability that 
might have genuinely resulted from the difficulties of her life. Through 
internalizing these gazes and self-regulating (Ussher 2008) her own behaviour, 
she may come to accept these attitudes as true and perceive herself as the ‘bad’ 
woman. She may judge her premenstrual self as improperly behaved and 
irrational and may seek advice from medical professions to help her regress back 
to the feminine ‘good’ woman that she is.  
 
Within this period, the study did not find any mention of positive premenstrual 
changes or positive meanings of premenstrual experience. Most of the studies 
during this time have constructed premenstrual experiences negatively and 
attributed the cause of PMT to the menstrual cycle physiology. Cline (1946: 137) 
discussed the possibility of a ‘disturbance of estrogen metabolism resulting in an 
excess of this [estrogen] hormone’ to explain premenstrual tension, whilst 
Benedek and Rubinstein (1939) discussed estrogen activity and psychodynamic 
processes for the etiology of PMT. Benedek and Rubinstein (1939: 245) wrote: 
‘The oestrogenous phase of the cycle corresponds to an emotional condition 
characterized by active heterosexual libido. This appears normally as a wish for 
heterosexual gratification but it may turn into aggression towards the man or into 
a fearful defensive attitude’. Others have portrayed the negative effects of PMT 
on the female body. Reimann (1946) pointed out that otherwise normal women 
show a premenstrual fever, whilst Johnson (1932) observed the effects of 
‘periodic disturbances’ on women’s performance on walking a tight-wire. Albeit 
unclear about what phase of the menstrual cycle was studied, Johnson found that 
‘girls experienced some difficulty in making fine neuro-muscular adjustments of 
the large muscles groups during period disturbances’ and ‘a rapid rise in the 
achievements seems to follow, reaching the peak at about eleven days after the 
period’ (Johnson 1932: 141). On the whole, the hormonal theories of PMT and 
the effects of PMT on the body drew on a biomedical discourse. The use of the 
biomedical discourse may function to legitimize PMT as a medical problem 
resulting from hormonal imbalance as well as legitimizing medical interventions to 
treat women complaining of PMT. Frank (1931) has, therefore, positioned PMT 
as a ‘pathology that needs to be eradicated’ (Ussher 2003: 136). The attention to 
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physiology gives ‘hormones primary status as an explanation of premenstrual 
distress’ (Markens 1996: 47). The analyses found no discussion of social, cultural 
and material factors in explaining the experience of premenstrual symptoms. The 
literature did not consider the possibility that factors outside of the body could 
cause or exacerbate premenstrual tension.  
 
In addition to the shifts in research focus, from menstruation to premenstrual 
phase and from ovaries to hormones, there was another change that was 
observed during this period. In the late 1930s and Second World War, when 
more women were needed in the workforce as men went to war, occupational 
researchers shifted their attention away from the incompetence of women during 
menstruation on the whole, to the possibility that particular types of work may not 
be suitable for women with PMT. Walker (1997) suggests that the demand for 
female labour during wartime and economic depression in Britain stimulated 
research, which generally concluded that ‘healthy’ menstruation did not impact on 
women’s ability to work (e.g. Seward 1944). For example, Holtz (1941) concluded 
that women with ‘healthy’ menstrual cycles are perfectly safe to fly aeroplanes 
while they are menstruating. Interestingly, this finding emerged during the 
Second World War when women pilots were flying military aircrafts and ferrying 
planes from factories to operational airfields (Cole 1992). The female pilots 
served to free male pilots for combat roles and duties. In other areas of work, 
researches were reporting similar findings. Lough (1937: 360) established that: 
‘menstruation has, as a rule, no noticeable effect on working capacity among 
normal, healthy women’. These studies provide evidence that when women’s 
work is beneficial to the economy, menstruation is a sign of health, whereas 
when the labour of women were seen unnecessary as in the post-war 1950s, 
menstruation became an illness again (as it was in the late nineteenth century). 
However, this redefining of women’s roles and capabilities was not the rule in 
other parts of the world during the war. For example in Nazi Germany there was 
extreme resistance, particularly from Hitler, to involving women in the war effort. 
The wider discourses about the ‘proper’ place and role of women i.e. the homes 
and childbearing, prevailed in Germany. Nazi Germany held the belief that the 
function of women was to be a good mother and bring up children (particularly to 
groom boys into soldiers and girls into young mothers) while their husbands 
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worked. These beliefs were widely held in the nineteenth century amongst the 
general public and prominent theorists and physicians. For example, Eliza Linton, 
a female theorist who wrote a number of anti-feminist articles on women’s rights, 
advocated the importance of maintaining a distinct separation between the 
spheres of work, with the home for women and the world outside for men. In 
1891 Linton wrote: ‘The continuance of the race in healthy reproduction, together 
with the fit nourishment and care of the young after birth, is the ultimate end of 
woman as such’ (Linton 1891 in Walker 1997: 32).  
 
3.3 The emergence of premenstrual syndrome (DSM-I 1952 & DSM-II 1968) 
 
In the 1950s, there was a change in the terminology that described premenstrual 
distress in women. In 1953, ‘premenstrual tension’ was relabelled as 
‘premenstrual syndrome’ (PMS) by a British General Practitioner, Katharina 
Dalton, and a British Endocrinologist, Dr. Raymond Greene. Both authors 
criticized Frank’s concept of PMT for being too simplistic, writing: ‘tension is only 
one of the many components of the syndrome’ (Greene & Dalton 1953: 1007). 
However, Greene and Dalton (1953) and others (e.g. Rees 1953) also argued 
that the term ‘PMS’ was not satisfactory. Rees (1953: 1014) commented that in 
‘some patients they [symptoms] occasionally continued throughout the menses’, 
that is, symptoms do not always stop after the premenstrual phase. Despite the 
issues with the onset and offset of the syndrome, the term ‘PMS’ and the focus 
on premenstrual phase was retained. This change in terminology appears to be 
an important shift in the medicalisation of premenstrual distress. The term 
‘tension’ does not really fit a medical diagnosis while ‘syndrome’, which means ‘a 
group of signs and symptoms that occur together and characterize a particular 
abnormality’ (Merriam-Webster’s online Dictionary n.d.) fits with recognised 
systems of nomenclature. 
 
During the 1950s, most of the research focused on the premenstrual experiences 
that make up the syndrome. In the 1960s and 1970s, research into the negative 
consequences of PMS on work and social functioning grew. A large number of 
studies searched for endocrine factors in PMS and explored the associations of 
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PMS and depression. Some effort was also spent on designing standardised 
questionnaires to assess menstrual and premenstrual experiences. In the mid-
1960s, psychologist Rudolph Moos published the Moos Menstrual Distress 
Questionnaire, consisting of 47 items, with all but five items focusing on negative 
symptoms of menstruation (Moos 1969). According to Walker (1997), the 
increased acknowledgement of women’s premenstrual experiences led to an 
increase in the number of women identifying themselves as PMS sufferers and 
seeking medical advice. This increase in women seeking medical advice for 
premenstrual distress could illustrate what Parsons (1951) referred to as the sick 
role. According to Parsons, the ‘sick role’ and the things that one does when they 
are determined as ‘ill’ are learned through socialization and through societal 
norms. Though the Illness takes away an individual’s responsibilities from 
society, the sick person is expected to try and find a way to solve their illness. It 
appears that the availability of a diagnosis may have conferred a type of 
‘respectability’ on the disorder, legitimated it and triggered an influx of help 
seekers to seek medical assistance for distress that was once considered a 
normal aspect of being a woman. Indeed for the influx of women needing help, 
clinics were being opened in London by Dalton to treat them with progesterone 
hormone injections and suppositories (Oransky 2004). Despite the dissemination 
of PMS research and advances in the clinics, there was no mention of PMS or 
any other menstrual related disorders in the first and second editions of the DSM 
(APA 1952, 1968). Nevertheless, the leading articles published around this time 
constructed premenstrual syndrome as a hormonal disorder that needed treating. 
With this in mind, one could speculate whether conceptualising premenstrual 
syndrome as a hormonal disorder was a protection against thinking of it as a 
psychiatric problem. After all, lots of physical (particularly hormonal) disorders 
have psychological and behavioural manifestations and they are not considered 
to be psychiatric problems. Nevertheless, the focus on psychological and 
emotional problems (as opposed to physical symptoms) of premenstrual distress 
does increase as we move through the decades, making it easier and more 
‘sensible’ to construct PMS as a psychiatric disorder.  
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 3.3.1 Constructing PMS as a hormonal disorder  
 
During this time, premenstrual changes were being described as a ‘minor 
endocrine disorder’ (Greene & Dalton 1953: 1007) consisting of numerous 
physical and emotional symptoms that require ‘medical attention’ (Simmons 
1956: 99). Rees (1953) wrote:  
 
Extract 2: The syndrome is composed of marked tension and irritability, 
together with one or more of the following symptoms: anxiety, 
depression, bloated abdominal feelings, swelling or subcutaneous 
tissues, nausea, fatigue, painful swelling of the breasts, 
headaches, dizziness, and palpitations. Less frequently there may 
be increased sex desire, excessive thirst, increased appetite, and 
hypersomnia. (Rees 1953: 1014)   
 
In the above extract, PMS was constructed as a ‘syndrome’ accompanied by 
emotional symptoms (which were in the minority) and physical symptoms 
including irritability, depression, headaches, nausea and so on. This construction 
of PMS is similar to Frank’s (1931) understanding of premenstrual changes. 
Similar to Frank (1931), Rees (1953) and Greene and Dalton (1953) believed that 
excessive oestrogen was responsible for some of the symptoms (i.e. sodium and 
water retention, painful breasts, weight gain, and dizziness), but they alleged that 
the lack of progesterone allowed for the ‘unopposed action of oestrogens’ to 
dominate and cause PMS symptomatology (Rees 1953: 1014). This illustrates 
that the construction of PMS had not changed from the 1930s, in the sense that 
both periods assumed premenstrual distress was caused by one factor in the 
body and could be treated by one factor. The deficiency of progesterone model 
was supported by studies that revealed positive effects of progesterone treatment 
(Greene & Dalton 1953, 1954; Rees 1953), either by oral administration, 
intramuscular injection, or implantation of progesterone (Dalton 1954). However, 
not all studies of this time supported progesterone etiology or progesterone 
treatment. Simmons (1956) found that in over half of his patients, the 
‘premenstrual symptoms were aggravated by the progesterone’ (Simmons 1956: 
100). Despite this, Dalton relentlessly pursued the progesterone theory and the 
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use of progesterone as a treatment. She argued that PMS was a debilitating 
disorder with various social consequences, and it needed diagnosing and 
treating. For instance, Greene and Dalton (1954) wrote that premenstrual 
changes can cause women to become unproductive at work, become mentally 
duller, more accident-prone and cause marital unhappiness. Due to these 
portrayed consequences, Dalton (1954) urged women who experience these 
symptoms to assist with the diagnosis. She suggested that the ‘recognition of this 
syndrome must depend on the intelligence of the patient, or her doctor’ (Greene 
& Dalton 1954: 339). Greene and Dalton (1953) wrote: 
 
Extract 3: In this country very little has been done to alleviate their distress. 
This is partly due to the attitude of the patients…women generally 
accept the unpleasant symptoms of ‘the change of life’ as a 
necessary part of the business of being a woman, so still they pass 
through one week of discomfort in every month, usually without 
complaining to their doctors but not necessarily without disturbing 
the tranquillity of their homes. (Greene & Dalton 1953: 1007) 
 
In the above extract, premenstrual changes have been constructed as something 
that is distressing for the ‘sufferer’ and disturbs the ‘tranquility of their homes’. 
This description echoes Frank’s (1931) understanding of the premenstrual 
distress, where the concern of PMT is considered by the impact it causes on her 
marriage and family life rather than the woman herself. Greene and Dalton is also 
evaluating women in terms of her presumed role and function in society – to 
serve their husbands, to be a good loving wife and promote the tranquility of her 
home. This construction ignores the impact of premenstrual distress on women 
themselves and neglects the possibility that the man (the husband) could have 
provoked a genuine grievance upon her and caused ‘marital unhappiness’. She is 
deemed to cause the problems and as a result, her bad feelings or behaviours 
become dismissed by both men and women. According to the extract, in addition 
to being the sole person who is responsible for the tranquility of her home, 
women are also responsible for seeking help. In the extract, Greene and Dalton 
partly blamed women for the slow diagnosis and treatment of the ‘disorder’ and 
suggested that PMS is not a ‘necessary part of being a woman’. This illustrates 
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that any positive accounts used by women can be overshadowed by the details 
of problems PMS can cause. It also demonstrates that women’s subjective 
meanings of premenstrual experiences were disregarded, neglected or simply not 
addressed in the PMS research of that time. Walker (1997) suggests that 
women’s reports of premenstrual experiences vary within a culture and cross-
culturally and the premenstrual states are not always described or experienced 
as an illness or disease. For example, Rupani and Lema (1993) in their study of 
nurses in Kenya comment that although premenstrual symptoms are reported, 
they do not limit work activities and very few women seek medical or other 
treatment for them. It would seem unacceptable to assume that these women’s 
views of their premenstrual symptoms and how they deal with it, is incorrect and 
unintelligent. According to Dalton, however, these women are likely to disrupt the 
tranquility of their homes whereas women who accept the medical approach to 
PMS are thought to be intelligent (Greene & Dalton 1953). By implication, the 
doctor’s opinion is positioned as the ‘truth’ and any other constructions, positive 
or meaningful are deemed incorrect. The construction of PMS using the medical 
discourse warrants the diagnosis and treatment of women experiencing 
premenstrual changes regardless of how women view their premenstrual 
changes. Indeed, the diagnosis and treatment has been justified because the 
premenstrual changes, if left untreated, has been reported to cause women to 
become violent, suicidal and incompetent at work.  
 
3.3.2 Constructing women with PMS as violent, suicidal and 
incompetent   
 









During the final week of the cycle many women experience great or 
small degrees of irritability which they may fail to control; 
depression which may lead to suicide; lethargy which may make it 
almost impossible for them to continue their work. Women air pilots 
may lose their skill and unaccountably crash (Whitehead 1934). 
French figures show that 84% of crimes of violence by women are 
committed during or immediately before the menses (Cooke 1945) 
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In the above extract, Greene and Dalton (1954) reported that during the 
premenstrual week many women experience ‘irritability’, ‘depression’ and 
‘lethargy’ that can cause her to lose control, commit suicide, become more 
accident prone and inefficient at work. As mentioned earlier, the increased focus 
on psychological issues has started to take shape here. Additionally, Greene and 
Dalton (1954, 1953) frequently mentioned the incapacitating effects of PMS on 
women’s ability to function at work. They also associated PMS with suicide and 
violence. Greene and Dalton (1954) supported these claims by citing three 
studies (Whitehead 1934; Cooke 1945; Morten et al., 1953) that have not been 
replicated to this date. Nevertheless, the analysis found that during the 1960s, 
Dalton carried out a number of studies and concluded that menstruation and 
PMS caused women to have high number of acute psychiatric admissions 
(Dalton 1959), more accidents (Dalton 1960), decline in cognitive ability (Dalton 
1960b), and higher crime rates (Dalton 1961). However, the high crime rates 
reported by Dalton (1961) must be seen in the context of very low base rates for 
crimes by women (particularly crimes of violence) in comparison to men (e.g. 
Heimer & De Coster 1999). Without evidence, Dalton speculates that the 
problematic behaviours such as crime and suicide are caused by the symptoms 








Premenstrual tension is also accompanied by irritability, lethargy, 
depression, and water retention, and these symptoms alone may 
be responsible for certain crimes- for example, irritability and loss 
of temper may lead to violence and assault, lethargy may lead to 
child neglect, and depression may lead to suicide. (Dalton 1961: 
1753)  
 
In this extract, Dalton has constructed premenstrual distress in several different 
ways. Premenstrual symptoms such as irritability, lethargy and depression have 
been constructed as something that can cause women to become mentally 
unstable, aggressive, violent, and abusive. These symptoms have been 
constructed as dangerous because the symptoms can lead to a child neglect or 
 (Greene & Dalton 1954: 337).  
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suicide. Dalton’s claims are speculations, not evidence based.  
 
In summary, the PMS literature between the 1950s to the 1980s constructed 
premenstrual distress as a minor endocrine disorder, consisting of numerous 
physical and emotional symptoms. Lack of progesterone hormone was thought to 
cause PMS and progesterone treatment was thought to treat it. The social 
consequences of PMS were used to advocate for a PMS diagnosis. These 
constructions drew on biomedical, psychiatric, criminal, and productivity 
discourses. The use of the psychiatric discourse contains the subject positions of 
the mentally ill and irrational. The use of the criminal discourse contains the 
subject positions of the aggressive, violent, unpredictable and dangerous. The 
use of the productivity discourse contains the subject positions of unintelligent, 
clumsy, and inefficient. The use of these discourses renders the premenstrual 
phase as a problematic ‘thing’ and positions women with PMS as mad, 
aggressive, unintelligent and incompetent. The use of these discourses also 
warrants certain things to happen to women. For example, the psychiatric 
discourse may warrant the treatment of those who are deemed mad, whilst the 
criminal discourse may warrant the punishment for those who commit crimes, 
though it is likely to be more complex than that. If criminality is at least partly 
explicable on the basis of hormonal changes then presumably the woman is less 
responsible and culpable. This has been illustrated, as we shall see, in the 1980s 
when two murder trials effectively used PMS as a defence.	  The use of PMS as a 
defence in criminal courts is a double-edged sword because it has the capacity to 
reduce the woman's agency for good or ill.  
 
Moreover, these constructions, like Frank (1931), are implicitly and explicitly 
defining how women should feel and behave (Markens 1996). Positioning women 
with PMS as abnormal, dangerous, neglecting and assaulting may have wider 
consequences for them. She may, for example, be positioned as a bad wife, an 
unfit mother and lose custody over her child; she may be positioned as an 
inefficient worker and may not be offered jobs of responsibility and higher salary; 
and she may experience stigma and discrimination from family, friends, and her 
community. As a result of these positions and practices, the woman diagnosed 
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with PMS may feel that she has failed as a woman, deem herself as ill and seek 
medical treatment. However, it is likely that these wider implications could broadly 
apply to all women presumably because premenstrual changes happen in the 
majority of women and they are all potentially open to developing such problems. 
Unless it is possible to single out specific women on the basis of PMS diagnosis, 
then all women could be discriminated on the basis of any premenstrual 
distress/changes. Evidence indicates that it not possible to distinguish PMS 
suffers from non-suffers (e.g. Van den Akker 1985). Thus, if all women have the 
potential to be stigmatised and discriminated simply because they menstruate, 
this may represent misogyny rather than science/evidence of a dysfunction.   
 
During this period of twenty years, Dalton wrote many books and articles on the 
destructive effect of PMS on the domestic and industrial world. According to 
Dalton, women with PMS are a cost to industry because of their inefficient work 
or absenteeism, and ruin their marriages through bad housekeeping and 
temperamental behaviour (Dalton 1969 in Walker 1997: 175). Though Dalton’s 
claims and studies had a powerful influence on researchers and women’s 
understanding of premenstrual distress, this period also saw the emergence of 
critique from feminists against Dalton’s work. Parlee (1973) criticized Dalton's 
research methods and questioned her goal of helping women to function more 
smoothly in their traditional stereotypical roles as subordinate to men. Similarly, 
Ussher (1991) suggests that Dalton’s claims function to ‘isolate women by 
denying or restricting them access to jobs or positions of responsibility, through 
the perpetuation of the belief that menstruating women are unstable’ (Ussher 
1991: 44). Indeed, after the Second World War and in the 1960s, as more and 
more women went to work, research on the relationship between the menstrual 
cycle and cognitive impairments resurfaced (Sommer 1973). In the 1930s and 
1940s when women were needed in the workforce, studies were reporting that 
women were not impaired at work during menstruation. However, in the 1950s 
and 1960s, the perception of menstrual handicap returned. Martin (1987) argued 
that the ‘menstruation as a liability’ perception resurfaced after the war because 
women were encouraged (and forced) to give up their jobs for returning (male) 
soldiers. Taylor (2005) emphasized that the handicap of menstruation only 
applied to women of higher status and those who were in a position of 
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responsibility within the workforce. Walker (1997: 170) suggests that ‘the 
existence of the label PMS can be used to both dismiss any form of ‘unfeminine’ 
behaviour and to deny women access to situations in which responsible actions 
are necessary’. Similarly, Laws et al., (1985) argued that the label serves to deny 
women access to the higher ranks of power and responsibility. The belief that a 
woman may suffer from PMS at any point and become unable to carry out tasks 
enables this form of discrimination to take place. Moreover, disabling women 
from accessing responsible and powerful jobs also means she is preserved for 
the household duties whilst men maintain their position of power and authority in 
the workface and society. Accordingly, Laws et al., (1985) argued that the label of 
PMS benefits patriarchy (and men), rather than women.  
 
3.4 The medicalisation of premenstrual syndrome (DSM-III 1980) 
 
In 1980, the third edition of the DSM-III was published (APA 1980). Though PMS 
was not included in the manual, this period saw a growth in menstrual cycle 
research followed by APA’s proposal to medicalize PMS. In the 1980s, the APA 
proposed to include PMS, under the name of late luteal phase dysphoric disorder’ 
(LLPDD) in DSM-III-R (APA 1987) along with paraphilic rapism and masochistic 
personality disorder. Feminists objected to the inclusion of these proposed 
categories on the grounds that these categories were not scientifically objective 
and were discriminatory towards women (Kutchins & Kirk 1989; Chrisler & 
Caplan 2002). The APA faced pressure from organized oppositions, protests, 
media, petitions, and letters summarizing the insubstantial scientific bases for the 
categories. However, this did not lead to the categories being dropped or being 
fully approved in the DSM, rather the APA placed the categories in the appendix 
of the manual for further studies. It is likely that the increase in research and the 
proposal for PMS to be included in the manual was due to the increased publicity 
surrounding the two murder trials that had permitted the use of PMS as a defence 
(Chrisler & Levy 1990). In the first, Sandie Smith stabbed a fellow employee to 
death. During the trial, Dr. Dalton was brought in as an expert witness for the 
defence. The judge sentenced her to 3 years probation provided that her 
behaviour improves whilst on heavy doses progesterone (Dalton’s 
recommendation). A year later, Christine English murdered her partner and once 
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again Dr. Dalton’s testimony was critical in getting the defendant off the hook 
completely. This illustrates the point made earlier about the double-edged sword 
– not only are women protected by the PMS defence, at the same time they are 
defined as mentally disordered. Since the murder trials, PMS concerned the 
medical researchers with greater reason and led to the development of 
questionnaires and techniques to measure premenstrual symptoms. And in spite 
of the controversial protests led by feminists against the inclusion of PMS, 
research continued to report on the debilitating effects of the ‘syndrome’ and 
offered support for the categorisation of PMS.  
 
3.4.1. Constructing PMS as an incapacitating illness that needs 
treating 
 
Throughout the 1980s PMS continued to be written about as an incapacitating 
illness. Dalton’s description of the PMS woman who is capable of producing a 
‘battered baby or bruised husband’ (Dalton 1971 in Steiner & Carroll 1977: 323) 
continued to be quoted approvingly by other researchers. Steiner and Carroll 
(1977) used Dalton’s results to associate premenstrual changes with an 
exacerbation of psychiatric illness, hospitalization, accidents and suicidality. 
Steiner, Haskett and Carroll (1980: 177) commented that all women experience 
‘premenstrual tension syndrome’ yet in some it is an ‘incapacitating ailment, 
serious enough to disrupt their lives and warrant treatment’. Again, like Frank and 
Dalton, there is an attempt in the literature to distinguish between ‘normal’ women 
and ‘abnormal’ women though all women are to some extent pathologized in that 
at least once a month they are unusually ‘tense’.	  Carroll and Steiner (1978) 
reviewed numerous studies on PMS and concluded that the evidence indicated 
that prolactin and ovarian hormones play a major role in the cause of PMS. This 
illustrates that another hormone in addition to the ovarian hormones is thought to 
be ‘responsible’ for PMS. The authors also reported that the drug bromocriptine 
was effective in treating both physical and behavioural premenstrual symptoms. 
They wrote: 	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Extract 6: The recent trials of bromocriptine are much more promising. This 
drug is believed to act by suppressing prolactin secretion and 
appears to be effective against both physical and behavioral 
premenstrual symptoms. (Steiner & Carroll 1977: 333) 
 
This extract suggests that women’s hormones cause PMS and drug treatment 
can help to alleviate both physical and behavioural symptoms. This construction 
of PMS is similar to earlier constructions made by Frank and Dalton. As 
mentioned before, the attention to physiology gives hormones primary status as 
an explanation without much discussion of social factors that may be involved in 
the experience of premenstrual symptoms (Markens 1996). Having said that, it is 
only meaningful to seek hormonal (or other) ‘explanations’ such as social factors 
only once a particular disorder/disease has been identified. In the case of 
premenstrual distress/changes, a disorder per se has not been identified.  
 
3.4.2 The construction of DSM diagnostic criteria for Premenstrual 
Tension Disorder  
 
The articles published during this period pressed for the inclusion of PMS in the 
DSM (Haskett & Abplanalp 1983; Steiner, Haskett & Carroll 1980). Steiner, 
Haskett and Carroll (1980) whilst acknowledging that PMS was not recognised as 
a distinct entity in DSM-III, developed the research diagnostic criteria for PMS, 
albeit they changed the name to ‘premenstrual tension disorder’. The authors of 
the article did not mention why the terminology had changed from ‘PMS’ to 
‘premenstrual tension disorder’. It might be that the change in terminology was a 
deliberate attempt to avoid potentially negative connotations that is associated 
with the term PMS. There are many PMS-related humorous connotations present 
in Western cultures and naming a psychiatric disorder as ‘PMS’ may not sound 
scientifically credible.  
 
The study collected data using 7 rating scales from 42 women thought to be 
suffering from severe premenstrual tension disorder. The diagnostic criteria are 
below: 
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Extract 7: 
PRIMARY RECURRENT PREMENSTRUAL TENSION DISORDER 
A. At least 5 of the following are required for definite and 4 for probable as part 
of a current episode. 
1. Irritable, hostile, angry, short-fused. 
2. Tense, restless, jittery, upset, high-strung, unable to relax. 
3. Decreased efficiency, fatigue. 
4. Dysphoric, marked spontaneous emotional lability, crying. 
5. Lowered motor coordination, clumsy, prone to accidents (cut finger, break 
dish, etc.). 
6. Distractible, confused, forgetful, difficulty in concentration, lowered 
judgment.  
7. Change in eating habits (cravings, overeating, etc.). 
8. Marked change in libido. 
B. Overall disturbance is so severe that at least one of the following is present: 
1. Serious impairment socially, with family, at home, at school or work. 
2. Sought or was referred for help from someone or took medication 
(especially tranquillizers and/or diuretics) at least once during a premenstrual 
period. 
C. Premenstrual dysphoric symptoms for at least the six preceding menstrual 
cycles. 
D. Symptoms only during the premenstrual period with relief soon after onset of 
menses. (Steiner, Haskett & Carroll 1980: 185) 
 
In the diagnostic criteria above, premenstrual distress has been constructed as a 
disorder that is manifested by emotional and behavioural symptoms. What strikes 
me as interesting is the way in which the psychological and behavioural aspects 
have, over time, come to be emphasised at the expense of the physical 
symptoms. This begs the question as to why this occurred and why people were 
so keen to recognise premenstrual distress as a psychiatric rather than medical 
or gynaecological problem. Gynaecologists and feminist writers have criticized 
the focus on affective experiences rather than somatic ones because the 
criteria/diagnosis excludes woman with purely physical premenstrual experiences 
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(O’Brian 1987), and it implies that all premenstrual experiences constitute a 
psychiatric disorder (Caplan et al., 1992). The authors of the study excluded 
physical symptoms from the diagnostic criteria by stating that some women 
manifest the emotional and behavioural symptoms without the physical ones. 
This reason offered by the authors could be interpreted as an attempt to 
construct premenstrual distress as a psychiatric disorder than a medical one. 
Moreover, although Haskett and Abplanalp (1983) provided evidence to suggest 
that this diagnostic criterion could distinguish a group of women with 
premenstrual tension disorder from a group of women without the condition, Van 
den Akker (1985) reported that women who report PMS symptoms were 
indistinguishable from a non-suffering control group. They suggest that the same 
cyclical symptoms can be found in women who complain of PMS and those who 
do not. Furthermore, the evidence for the presentation of symptoms constructed 
in the diagnostic criteria is weak. For example, studies have not been able to find 
any significant differences in cognitive test performance during the premenstrual 
week (e.g. Golub 1976). Most of the symptoms reported in the diagnostic 
category appear to be stereotypic beliefs regarding menstrual cycle symptoms. In 
particular, these symptoms appear to reiterate Dalton’s conclusions about the 
effects of PMS on women’s functioning. 
  
3.5 The emergence of premenstrual dysphoric disorder (DSM-III-R 1987 & 
DSM-IV 1994) 
 
During the mid-1980s, the need for the inclusion of PMS in DSM and the 
identification of the ‘true’ PMS sufferer from ‘healthy’ women became essential 
for psychiatrists. This period saw the most development towards the 
medicalisation of PMS. In 1987, PMS was included as ‘Late Luteal Phase 
Dysphoric Disorder’ (LLPDD) in the appendix of the DSM-III-R (APA 1987). 
Subsequently, and in spite of APA’s subcommittee concluding that very little 
research supported the existence of LLPDD, the term was retained albeit 
changed to ‘premenstrual dysphoric disorder’ (PMDD) and was included in the 
DSM-IV research appendix (APA 1994). In 1992, PMS was listed in the 
International Classification of Diseases Manual (World Health Organization 
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1992). In 1999, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the 
antidepressant Prozac for the treatment of PMDD (Taylor 2006). Majority of the 
biomedical research continued and more research was now focusing on the brain 
and its interaction with the ovarian system as a source of dysfunction. The 
neuroendocrine theories were thought to account for PMS either as a result of 
altered sensitivities of neurotransmitters to ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’ levels of ovarian 
hormones (Walker 1997). However, how the proposed interaction between these 
two different systems takes place remains unidentified (Walker 1997). At the 
same time, there was also an increased emphasis on separating PMDD from 
clinical depression and constructing PMDD as a distinct diagnostic category.  
 
3.5.1 PMDD as a distinct diagnostic category 
 
During the 1990s, numerous studies argued that PMDD was distinct from PMS 
and depression (e.g. Steiner 1997; Endicott et al., 1999). Endicott et al., (1999) 
reviewed the literature up until the late 1990s and provided evidence in support of 
the concept that PMDD is a distinct entity. The paper summarises a meeting that 
took place in 1998 between reputable experts in the field. Endicott et al., (1999) 
summarised the points from the meeting: 
 
Extract 8: • In terms of symptom profile, PMDD differs from other mood or 
anxiety disorder. In particular, internal tension, anger, and 
irritability as characteristic of PMDD 
• The key difference between PMDD and other disorders is the 
clear onset and clear offset of symptoms, both linked to the 
menstrual cycle. There is considerably stability in the course of 
PMDD from cycle to cycle and over time in the absence of 
treatment.  
• Biologic characteristics outside the normal range tend to be 
related to the serotonin system 
• Symptoms of PMDD can be treated effectively 
• PMDD differs in response to treatment in comparison with other 
disorders. 
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• Blocking the menstrual cycle will cure women with PMDD but 
not those with other mood disorders 
… sufficient evidence is now available to support the use of SSRIs 
in this disorder. (Endicott et al., 1999: 676) 
 
In the above extract, premenstrual distress has been constructed as a distinct 
clinical entity, differing from mood or anxiety disorders. The summary indicates 
that PMDD responds well to treatment with SSRI’s and is possibly caused by 
dysfunctions in the serotonin system. The serotonin theory was widely held by 
other prominent researchers of this time (e.g. Steiner 1997). Steiner (1997) 
wrote: ‘increasing evidence suggests that serotonin (5-HT) may be important in 
the pathogenesis of PMDD’ (Steiner 1997: 450). Endicott et al., (1999) and 
Steiner (1997) both comment that the diagnostic criteria for PMDD appear more 
stringent than for any other condition because a key component of the criteria 
include the onset of symptoms during the luteal phase of the cycle and offset 
during the early follicular phase. Steiner (1997) suggests that the strict criteria 
means that not all women who have premenstrual symptoms necessarily have a 
mental illness, but those who experience extremely distressing emotional and 
behavioral symptoms premenstrually and meet the requirements of the diagnostic 
criteria will be validated by a diagnosis. This seems to imply that the diagnosis is 
for the women's own good, suggesting that the only way of legitimating their 
experiences is by medicalising them.	  However, the analysis found inconsistent 
reports about the DSM criteria, which require that two cycles of mood and 
behavioural symptoms must be observed in women with PMDD. Whilst, Bloch et 
al., (1997) reported that women with PMDD have individual-specific symptom 
patterns that are stable and replicable across cycles, both Walker (1994) and 
Hardie (1997) found intercylic inconsistency. Walker (1994) found that in two 
consecutive menstrual cycles, physical experiences proved more consistent 
across cycles than did emotional ones. They both concluded that premenstrual 
experiences vary between menstrual cycles and suggest that the premenstrual 
changes cannot be adequately explained on the basis of simple biological 
determinism. Hardie (1997) argued that the widespread and largely inaccurate 
beliefs about premenstrual changes stems from early biomedical menstrual cycle 
research, the bulk of which was conceptually and methodology flawed but 
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nevertheless powerful in shaping the public perception of PMS. Despite the 
contradictory findings, it was widely held that PMDD is a distinct category that 
can be measured objectively and differentiated from any other conditions.  	  
The analysis found that during the 1980s and 1990s, premenstrual distress has 
been constructed as a distinct psychiatric disorder caused by low serotonin levels 
in the brain. The studies also suggested that PMDD could be effectively treated 
with SSRI’s. Thus etiology and treatment of premenstrual distress has shifted 
from the previous etiologies and treatment practiced by Frank and Dalton. This 
recent portrayal of premenstrual distress was made despite many members in 
Endicott et al., commenting that the evidence for the etiology of PMDD and the 
effectiveness of SSRI treatment is limited. Moreover, Dr. Severino in the meeting 
highlighted that most of the research on PMS/PMDD has been conducted in the 
US and expressed that ‘If affective premenstrual distress cannot be identified 
consistently in non-United States or European populations, consideration must be 
given to the criticism that PMDD is a culturally bound syndrome or an 
unnecessary pathologising of cyclical changes in women’ (Endicott et al., 1999: 
666). Dr. Pearlstein also commented that ‘there is limited self-report or observer-
confirmed information on functional impairment associated with PMDD’ (Endicott 
et al., 1999: 669) suggesting that women are more concerned with the effects on 
relationships (i.e. arguments with family and friends) than effects on work. 
Endicott et al., (1999) reported that recent reviews were unable to confirm luteal 
phase impairment in attention, memory, or learning (e.g. Morgan et al., 1996). 
Despite this, the medicalisation of premenstrual distress and the reporting of the 
debilitating effects of premenstrual distress continued. For the purpose of this 
study, it is important to comprehend why this has occurred.  
 
3.6 The concept of premenstrual dysphoric disorder (DSM 5 2013) 
 
From the mid-1980s to the present, we have seen a steady push towards the 
medicalization of premenstrual experiences (Taylor 2006). At present, the Mood 
Disorders Work Group for DSM 5 has recommended that PMDD be moved from 
the appendix to reside as a diagnosis in the Mood Disorders section of the 
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manual. The analysis found that numerous researchers have supported this 
proposal (e.g. Cunningham et al., 2009; Epperson et al., 2012; Hartlage et al., 
2012; Protopopescue et al., 2008; Reed et al., 2008; Pearlstein & Steiner 2008). 
Most of these studies continued to portray premenstrual changes as a disorder 
that causes impairments in functioning.  
 
3.6.1 PMDD is a distinct disorder that causes impairments of work 
and social functioning 
 
The analysis found that research studies (e.g. Hartlage et al., 2012; Reed et al., 
2008; Epperson et al., 2012) and literature reviews (e.g. Cunningham et al., 
2009; Yonkers et al., 2008) have generally reported mood symptoms such as 
irritability, tension, and labile mood for PMDD and constructed PMDD as a 
debilitating condition. Pearlstein and Steiner (2008) wrote: 
 
Extract 9: The burden of illness of PMDD results from the severity of 
symptoms, the chronicity of the disorder and the impairment in 
work, relationships and activities. It has been estimated that 
women with PMDD cumulatively endure 3.8 years of disability over 
their reproductive years. A study of 1194 women who prospectively 
rated their symptoms reported that women with PMDD were more 
likely to endorse hours missed from work, impaired productivity, 
role limitations and less effectiveness (Chalwa et al., 
2002)…Borenstein et al., (2003) [found that] women with confirmed 
PMDD reported significantly lower quality of life, increased 
absenteeism from work, decreased work productivity, impaired 
relationships with others and increased visits to health providers, 
compared with control women. These authors also reported that, 
given a 14% absenteeism rate and a 15% reduction in productivity, 
PMDD was associated with US$4333 indirect costs per patient per 
year.” (Pearlstein & Steiner 2008: 292) 
 
In this extract, PMDD has been constructed as a disabling illness that can 
diminish women’s quality of life and impair their ability to function at work and in 
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relationships. PMDD has been rendered problematic because it can lead to 
decreased work productivity and absenteeism from work. The authors also 
portray women with premenstrual distress as a financial burden to employers. In 
the extract the authors estimate how much money it would cost per women per 
year if she were handicapped by her premenstrual changes. Others have also 
mentioned these costs (e.g. Cunningham et al., 2009) and provided evidence for 
the performance impairment (e.g. Reed et al., 2008). During this time, biomedical 
research continued and etiological studies investigated numerous possible causal 
mechanisms, with an increasing emphasis on the role of neuroendocrine factors 
in PMS. At the same time, more and more studies were providing evidence to 
show that PMDD can be differentiated from depression. In order for PMDD to be 
included in DSM 5, research evidence must show that PMDD is distinct from 
mood disorders. Pearlstein and Steiner (2008: 293) wrote, ‘PMDD should 
generally not be diagnosed when an underlying depression or anxiety disorder is 
present.’ Epperson et al., (2012) wrote:  
 
Extract 10: Women experience a pattern of distressing symptoms beginning 
in the luteal phase of the menstrual cycle and terminating shortly 
after the onset of menses. This pattern of symptom expression is 
distinct from that of other disorders …One of the most potent 
predictive validators of premenstrual dysphoric disorder as a 
disorder distinct from mood disorders is its preferential response 
to SSRIs. In no other psychiatric disorder do SRIs reduce 
symptoms with as short an onset of action as in premenstrual 
dysphoric disorder. (Epperson et al., 2012: 466-470)   
 
This extract suggests that the evidence that PMDD is distinct from mood 
disorders has been supported, not by locating the etiological factors of each, but 
by reporting on the differential treatment response between these conditions. 
This extract has constructed PMDD as a condition that can be effectively treated 
with pharmaceutical medication that targets the serotonin system in the brain. 
The analysis shows that the serotonin system and its interaction with sex 
hormones were widely reported as the etiology of PMDD. Cunningham et al., 
(2009) wrote: 
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Extract 11: Aberrations in serotonergic transmission are found in women 
with PMS/PMDD. Symptomatic women have lower density of 
serotonin transporter receptors than do controls. Premenstrual 
symptoms are diminished both by serotonin reuptake inhibitors 
and by other treatments that increase serotonin (Cunningham et 
al., 2009: 126). 
 
Additionally, Pearlstein and Steiner (2008) commented that FDA has approved 
the use of the SSRI’s fluoxetine, sertraline and paroxetine for women with PMDD. 
Both Pearlstein and Steiner (2008) and Cunningham et al., (2009) have reported 
that SSRI’s have high efficacy rates compared to other treatments such as 
hormonal interventions, oral contraceptives, progesterone or estrogen therapy, 
cognitive therapy, herbal remedy, and lifestyle modifications. All of these findings 
show that the cause of PMDD has been searched inside the body, without much 
discussion of social factors that may also cause or exacerbate the experience of 
premenstrual distress (Markens 1996). The use of the biomedical approach in the 
etiology and treatment of PMDD provides support for the inclusion of PMDD in 
the manual. Ironically, the possible advancement of the aetiology and treatment 
of PMDD is also used to highlight the benefit of including PMDD in DSM 5.  
 
3.6.2. Benefits of including PMDD in DSM 5 
 
The analysis found that various studies (e.g. Cunningham et al., 2009; Epperson 
et al., 2012) have reported on the benefits of including PMDD in the main text of 
the DSM 5. Epperson et al., (2012) wrote:  
 
Extract 12: The Food and Drug Administration and similar authorities in other 
countries have approved several pharmacological agents for the 
treatment of PMDD, making it a de facto diagnosis regardless of its 
position within DSM…The inclusion of PMDD as a diagnostic 
category may further facilitate the development of medications that 
are useful for treatment and may encourage additional biological 
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research on the causes of the disorder... The overall health benefit 
for women of having an empirically based diagnosis would thus 
outweigh the potential for unfounded stigmatization or demeaning 
remarks that some groups fear. (Epperson et al., 2012: 470-471) 
 
This extract suggests that PMDD is a ‘real’ category and FDA recognizes this and 
approves the treatment of it. There is a striking circularity here. The approval of 
medication is taken as evidence that a disorder is recognised and this is then 
adduced to support a claim that formal recognition will serve to encourage 
research into the causes. Paradoxically, the disorder ‘exists’ because we 
medicate something – this approval of medication is being used as an argument 
for research into the origins that has previously failed. This argument seems to 
perform like a completely closed system that does not appear to permit refutation. 
Nevertheless, Epperson et al., (2012) proposes that PMDD should be classified 
as diagnostic category since the benefits of inclusion outweigh any stigma. The 
benefits of including PMDD as a diagnostic category, as noted by Epperson et 
al., include the development of better treatments and understanding of the 
biological underpinnings of the condition. Epperson et al., (2012) have also 
developed diagnostic criteria for PMDD and recommended that DSM 5 task-
group members consider the criteria and include it in the manual. Apart from 
minor differences, the criteria are identical to the ones proposed in DSM-5.org.  
 
In summary, these studies have constructed premenstrual distress as a distinct 
psychiatric disorder and proposed for the inclusion of PMDD in DSM 5 manual as 
a category of its own. Studies of this time period have constructed premenstrual 
distress as an illness that is caused by low serotonin level in the brain that can be 
effectively treated with SSRI’s. The extract suggests that FDA has approved the 
pharmaceutical treatment of PMDD and this means that the diagnosis is a fact 
(‘de facto’). One of the implications of including FDA’s approval might be that it 
makes PMDD appear like a ‘real’ condition. The studies have drawn on a 
psychiatric discourse that enables the authors to suggest there is a group of 
women who meet the criteria for PMDD and can be treated with psychiatric 
medication. This group of women is positioned as mentally ill, emotionally labile, 
irritable, and angry. As mentioned before, all of these discourses, practices and 
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subject positions have wider consequences for the person being classified i.e. 
unfit mother, bad wife, and inefficient employee. The studies also draw on a 
productivity discourse that renders the premenstrual phase as a problematic 
‘thing’ and positions women as inefficient and costly to their employers. These 
constructions of PMDD not only reinforces the nineteenth century idea that 
women are a liability to employers whilst they are menstruating, it may also 
prevent women from being offered jobs of more responsibility, power and money. 
By implication, she may be encouraged to stay at home and carry out tasks that 
are ‘naturally’ assigned to the female gender. This move may be beneficial to the 
patriarchal society and pharmaceutical industries, but not necessarily to women 
who are diagnosed (Laws et al., 1985). Additionally, researchers too can build 
careers on the medicalisation of premenstrual changes i.e. by receiving funding 
from pharmaceutical companies to promote pharmaceutical treatments and look 
for the biological basis of PMDD.  
 
3.7 Research Questions 
 
In this section, the results will be pulled together and discussed in reference to 
the following research questions.  
 
3.7.1 How do psychological and psychiatric literatures construct 
premenstrual changes?  	  
On the whole, the analysis revealed that the construction of premenstrual 
changes since the 1930s have been negative. Premenstrual changes have been 
portrayed as pathological, debilitating, incapacitating for women sufferers and 
unbearable for those around her. Emotional problems such as irritability, 
depression, lethargy, and anger are predominantly noted as the most destructive 
premenstrual changes (e.g. Greene and Dalton 1954). The PMS/PMDD sufferer 
has been constructed as someone who is functionally impaired at work and in her 
social and family life. During the 1930s, premenstrual changes were constructed 
as ‘PMT’ consisting of both physical and mental tension caused by excessive 
estrogen hormone (Frank 1931). Between the periods of 1950s to 1980s, 
premenstrual changes were constructed as ‘PMS’ caused by progesterone 
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deficiency (Greene and Dalton 1953). PMS was portrayed as a debilitating 
syndrome that caused some women to become ‘suicidal, violent, mentally dull, 
more accident prone, and abusive towards her husband and children’ (Dalton 
1961: 1753). Both ‘PMT’ and ‘PMS’ were constructed as an incapacitating illness 
that needs treating. In 1987, PMS was conceptualised as a psychiatric disorder in 
the name of LLPDD within the revised third edition of the DSM (APA 1987). 
Subsequently, LLPDD was renamed to PMDD and was listed in the appendix of 
DSM-IV (APA 1994). Researchers around the 1990s constructed PMDD as a 
distinct diagnostic category that can be measured objectively and differentiated 
from any other mood conditions (Endicott et al., 1999). At the same time, 
neuroendocrine theories of PMDD proposed that dysfunctions in the serotonin 
system are the most likely cause of PMDD. At present, PMDD continues to be 
constructed as a psychiatric disorder, which causes impairments of work and 
social functioning. The treatment choice for women diagnosed with PMDD is 
SSRIs. Since the 1930s to the present, a biomedical approach has been 
employed in explaining and treating premenstrual distress. The use of the 
biomedical approach has helped in the process of conceptualising and 
constructing premenstrual distress as a serious psychiatric disorder consisting of 
emotional, behavioural and physical symptoms. Within the literature, three 
different but connected knowledges or ‘truths’ produced and disseminated by 
psychiatrists and psychologists have helped to reify PMDD as a pathological 
problem. I will now consider these ‘truths’ individually.  
 
The first of these ‘truths’ proposes that: “PMDD is an identifiable condition that 
can be objectively defined”. This ‘truth’ proposes that women who suffer from 
PMDD (sufferers) can be identified and distinguished from other women who do 
not have PMDD (non-sufferers). This type of conceptualisation constructs PMDD 
as a distinct phenomenon separate from normal suffering. The search for 
premenstrual symptomatology and the deliberation over the precise diagnostic 
criteria for PMS/PMDD including the number of cycles the symptoms need to be 
present and the degree of impairment required for diagnosis, has helped to 
construct PMDD as a real identifiable disorder. Additionally, the reported 
distinctiveness of PMDD from other mood disorders and the introduction of 
standardised questionnaires (e.g. Moos 1968) has helped in the 
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conceptualisation of PMDD as a distinct disorder that can be objectively identified 
and differentiated from normal premenstrual distress. Similarly, Ussher (2003, 
2008) also found that the knowledge circulated by psychiatry and psychology has 
helped to construct ‘PMDD as a thing that can be objectively defined and 
measured’ (Ussher 2003: 135). However, an argument could be made here 
against the classification of premenstrual distress as a psychiatric problem. It 
could be argued that the classification could be pathologizing something that is 
essentially and inextricably part of being a woman. For instance, during the late 
nineteenth century, though there was no evidence, physicians strongly held the 
belief that abnormalities within the body caused women to become mad. The 
ovaries were seen as the dominant organs controlling women’s mind and body 
and menstruation was viewed as the cause of female maladies. However, at that 
time, a problem raised for the theorists was the realization that ‘ovulation and 
menstruation do not happen at the same time’, leaving theorists unsure on which 
part of the menstrual cycle to focus on and render it as the cause of female 
madness (Walker 1997: 34). This problem was solved in 1920s following the 
‘discovery’ of the female sex hormones estrogen and progesterone. It was no 
longer dysfunctional menstruation or dysfunctional ovulation that causes women 
to become mad, but dysfunctional hormones found in the premenstrual phase. It 
was the emergence of the hormonal discourse and the ‘discovery’ of the sex 
hormones that shifted research focus from menstruation to the premenstrual 
changes. The ‘discovery’ of the hormones was also used to support previous 
belief that abnormalities within the body causes women to become mad. None of 
these beliefs have been based on evidence. Therefore there is no scientific 
reason for the pathologization of menstruation or any aspects of menstruation.  
 
A further issue here is the way in which PMDD has been turned into a psychiatric 
condition largely by neglecting the presence and impact of physical changes (e.g. 
breast tenderness, dysmenorrhea, and headaches) that many women experience 
during the premenstrual week. Was this a strategic move from the creators of 
PMDD to dismiss critics who may question why premenstrual distress is 
considered a psychiatric problem rather than a physical (or gynaecological) one? 
Caplan et al., (1992) point out that a thyroid problem may lead to mood and 
behaviour changes, yet it is doubtful that anyone would consider the person with 
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the thyroid problem as mentally ill. However, this criticism should not be taken as 
a way of suggesting that, like thyroid problem, premenstrual changes should be 
considered a physical illness. Rather this problem points out that normal 
premenstrual experiences include both physical and emotional changes, but the 
psychiatric and psychological literature has carved out and focused on the 
emotional aspects in order to conceptualise premenstrual distress into a 
psychiatric problem.  
 
The second of these ‘truths’ proposes that: “PMDD is an individual phenomena 
that can be treated using medical interventions”. Since the 1930s, psychiatric 
literature has constructed premenstrual changes as a hormonal disorder that 
needs treating with medical interventions such as hormones and psychiatric 
drugs. The production of hormonal theories and the practice of medical 
interventions have helped to conceptualize PMDD as an individual phenomenon. 
The study found that the focus for treatment was within women’s bodies (i.e. rest 
in bed, hormonal treatment, and SSRI’s medication). However, placing the 
hormones as the dominant explanation of premenstrual distress and insisting on 
individual treatment programs may not be appropriate or helpful to women. There 
is evidence to suggest that relational, social, economic, cultural and structural 
factors can contribute to both the experience and perception of premenstrual 
changes (e.g. Ussher & Perz 2008). Markens (1996) argues that the medical 
construction of PMS tends to ignore the gendered divisions of labor within social 
institutions, which can contribute to the physiological manifestation of symptoms 
(e.g. stress, anger, and fatigue). Markens (1996) reasons that women’s lives are 
stressful and highly demanding; not only do women try to successfully 
accomplish the demands of work and home life, they also do much of the 
emotional work in both of these arenas. Rather than prescribing antidepressants, 
social and institutional modifications in the form of changes in their day-to-day 
tasks and duties at home and at work may be more receptive to their needs and 
benefit women more generally and at times when premenstrual distress is 
severe. Martin (1989) argued that changes in the nature and or structure of work 
time could be more helpful to women than changes that focus on making 
modifications within her body. According to Laws et al., (1985) individual drug 
treatment of women benefit drug companies and generally patriarchal society – 
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both of whom attribute any ‘inconvenient’ female behaviour to her hormones, 
rather than having to deal with the realities that women’s lives or experiences are 
difficult and need to be changed (which may involve change for men themselves). 
Moncrieff (2009 in Ussher 2010: 25) has provided numerous accounts of 
evidence to suggest that psychotropic medication, particularly when used 
alongside therapy, may be beneficial for alleviating some cases of ‘extreme 
mental turmoil’ but it is not necessary or appropriate for the distress that many of 
people experience in every day life (such as depressed feelings).   
 
The lack of attention to these social, structural, and political factors within the 
psychiatric and psychological literature can also contribute to a medical 
construction of PMDD and privilege the biomedical approach in explaining and 
treating PMDD. Additionally, within this construction, there is an implicit 
assumption that negative experiences, such as the premenstrual experiences, 
should not be tolerated and should be removed. Within this perspective, it is 
assumed that our moods, behaviour and reactions should remain constant and 
not fluctuate; that any changes in our moods, behaviour and bodily experiences, 
is a pathology that needs eradicating (Ussher 2003). One could speculate that 
the lack of fluctuation in mood and behaviour in women benefit others 
(particularly men) rather than women themselves. If she is calm, gets on with 
work without complaining, nurtures others, and does not express any feelings of 
anger or irritability, then nothing needs to be addressed, no problems need to be 
fixed, and no one else needs to change. Paradoxically, even if she experiences 
fluctuations in her mood and behaviour and expresses some anger, according to 
the premenstrual research, she will be the one that needs to change and get 
better, not others.  
 
The third ‘truth’ proposes that: “women with PMDD experience incapacitating 
symptoms”. The negative effects of PMDD on women’s lives have been written 
about since the 1930s. These include irritability, depression, lethargy, and anger. 
PMDD has been constructed as a disabling illness that can diminish women’s 
quality of life and impair their ability to function at work and in relationships. 
However, the negative symptoms are implicitly and explicitly defining how women 
should feel and behave (Markens 1996). The ‘good’ woman, as far as the PMS 
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literature is concerned, is one who is sweet-tempered, calm, kind, placid and 
undemanding, whereas the ‘bad’ women or the premenstrual women is someone 
who is angry, demanding, and improperly behaved (e.g. Laws et al., 1985). 
These constructions of how women should behave impacts on how women are 
viewed by their family members and work colleagues. Being classified as a ‘bad’ 
or ‘premenstrual’ woman may have potential effects on employment and family 
relationships, particularly convincing them that she can function adequately at 
home and at work. Additionally, the label of PMDD can function to allow the ‘bad’ 
feelings and behaviour to be dismissed by both men and women since they 
become conceptualised as incapacitating symptoms of a disorder rather than 
genuine grievance caused by relational, social and structural factors. In 
describing the negative symptomatology of PMDD, the literature has contrasted a 
‘normal’ woman to an ‘abnormal’ one. However, the boundaries of ‘normal’ and 
‘abnormal’ women appear to be influenced by the discourses of femininity, rather 
than science.  
 
In summary, since the 1930s the psychiatric and psychological literature has 
constructed premenstrual changes negatively. The analysis did not find any 
mention of positive aspects of premenstrual changes. The study found three 
interrelated ‘truths’ about PMDD that are present throughout the literature. These 
include: PMDD is an identifiable condition that can be objectively defined; PMDD 
is an individual phenomenon that can be treated using medical interventions; and 
women with PMDD experience incapacitating symptoms. These truths, 
constructed through the language used by researchers and clinicians, have 
helped in the conceptualisation of PMDD as a medical and psychiatric 
phenomenon. Additionally, these truths may have influenced men and women’s 
perception of premenstrual changes as a disorder, as well as influencing some 
women’s perception of their own premenstrual changes as a disorder (see 
research question three).  
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3.7.2 Under what circumstances are women’s premenstrual changes 
rendered problematic and what professional discourses render these 
problems intelligible?  
 
Foucault’s (1977) ‘genealogical’ approach serves to show that knowledge and 
categories of any particular kind, such as ‘mental illness’ or ‘PMDD’, are not 
universal, atemporal and objective. According to Foucault, all concepts or 
knowledge comes from somewhere, all knowledge is linked into history and 
culture, and all knowledge is constructed and produced by discourses. Using 
Foucault’s ideas of knowledge, we ask how the concept of PMDD came about, 
how it became accepted as common sense, and what discourses have been 
used to render the problem intelligible. The present study found that the 
discourses of science, medicine, and biomedicine have been heavily used in the 
psychiatric and psychological literature on PMS/PMDD. These discourses have 
been central in creating a version of truth that is deemed real and valid. The use 
of these discourses has helped to construct premenstrual distress as a real 
psychiatric disorder. The language used by researchers and clinicians in the 
literature has been crucial in constructing PMDD as a real, distinct, and 
incapacitating disorder, rather than a socially constructed category. Boyle (2002) 
highlights that in Western society those versions of physical, mental and bodily 
events offered by the discourses of science and medicine are given greater 
credence and thought of as real. The present analysis found that the literature 
was entrenched with references to medical, physical, mental and bodily events. 
The terms such as ‘scientific’, ‘epidemiology’, ‘research’, ‘biology’, ‘psychiatric’, 
‘physical’, ‘mental’, ‘hormones’, ‘neurotransmitters’, etc., have been heavily used 
in the literature. Accounts of ‘hormones’, ‘neurotransmitters’, the ‘endocrine 
system’ and the ‘reproductive system’, have been mentioned in connection to the 
etiology of PMDD. The use of these words/theories not only fosters the 
impression that PMDD is a real bodily disease; it also signifies that the author of 
the study is an expert in the medical field, and therefore their articulations are the 
‘truth’. Thus, the use of medical and scientific words legitimizes the profession 
and makes their ideas appear as real, neutral and objective. The present study 
found that the use of neutral words in objective manner allowed PMDD to appear 
as real scientific fact rather than a cultural stereotype or gender bias. This way of 
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writing has been referred to the ‘empiricist discourse/ repertoire’ (Boyle 2002). 
Boyle (2002) suggests that the neutral and objective tone can be achieved when, 
for example, the researcher uses a passive voice (the research was designed) 
and phrases that imply that the research uncovers ‘facts’ (the research found 
that...). This style of writing helps to cover up the researcher’s opinions and 
biases. There is also evidence that new discoveries, such as hormones, were 
recruited in support of the biomedical discourse. 
 
Moreover, the present study found that the literature made use of the language 
often used in medicine. For instance, most of the literature had said something 
along the lines of: “Women with PMDD experience physical and emotional 
symptoms that are listed in the diagnostic criteria of the DSM, once identified, 
women with PMDD can be given a diagnosis and offered treatment in the form of 
pharmaceutical medication to eradicate the symptomatology of the disorder”. The 
use of these terms creates the impression of similarity between medical disorders 
and psychiatric constructs (Boyle 2002). Interestingly, the PMDD literature rarely 
used the terms ‘mental disorder’ or ‘mental illness’ to refer to PMDD. This may 
have been deliberate because these terms tend to have numerous negative 
connotations and wider implications, such as stigma and discrimination. It is 
possible that the explicit use of the term ‘mental disorder’ in relation to PMDD will 
deter women from diagnosing themselves. Indeed Chrisler (2013) found that 
students use the term ‘PMS’ to refer to premenstrual changes without even 
realizing that the ‘S’ stands for ‘syndrome’ and means a medical disorder. Nash 
and Chrisler (1997) found that the knowledge of PMS as a psychiatric diagnosis 
increased participants’ perception of premenstrual changes as a problem for 
women in general. These participants were more willing to attach a psychiatric 
diagnosis to women they know, but they were less willing to attach a psychiatric 
diagnosis to themselves. This suggests that medical and biomedical language 
can play an important role in the way we understand human distress, although 
our understanding may differ depending on whose distress is being described 
(i.e. our own vs. others). Similarly, Lafrance and McKenzie-Mohr (2013) argue 
that the biomedical frameworks have infiltrated our individual consciousness to 
the extent that in everyday conversations people use the biomedical framework 
to make sense of distress. Certainly, in modern Western culture, the most 
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dominant way of understanding distress is through a biomedical lens. Knowledge 
through these lenses is considered to be reasonable, intelligent, and truthful. 
Hence the ‘truths’ of premenstrual changes that have been constructed using 
medical and scientific languages (tied to the discourses of science and medicine) 
have helped to create the concept of PMDD. 
 
However, to Foucault, all knowledge / truth is connected with the notion of power 
and power works in opposition to the truth. According to Foucault, powerful 
groups create ideologies, distort versions of ourselves, our history and reality, 
and ‘suppress’ the truth (Foucault in Bracken and Thomas 2010: 225). Figert 
(2005: 103) found that concepts or diseases achieve legitimacy when scientists 
or physicians, who have the ‘cognitive authority to define, describe or explain’ 
reality, call them real. If scientists or physicians define things as real, then the 
general public also believe it to be real. Figert (2005) argues that the concept of 
PMS has become a real medical condition because numerous professionals, 
including scientists, physicians, and doctors have defined it as such. The present 
study found that in psychiatric and psychological literature, researchers and 
clinicians have defined PMDD as a real phenomenon and an illness. Similar 
constructions have been found in magazines and newspapers (Markens 1996). A 
Foucauldian analysis would argue that psychiatry has created a distorted version 
of premenstrual experiences and society has accepted this version to be the 
truth. Lafrance (2007: 128) argues that the biomedical perspective is powerful 
because it uses medical concepts and draws on medical discourses, and 
medicine has the ‘economic, political and institutional power to shape our view of 
the world’.  
 
Lafrance and McKenzie-Mohr (2013) highlight that the biomedical formulation 
inherent in the DSM has been born out of a historical context, emerging in the 
1960s and 1970s when psychiatry was heavily criticized for the lack of reliability 
and validity of mental disorders. Prior to this, the DSM had a psychoanalytic 
theoretical orientation. The biomedical approach offered the promise of a 
scientific understanding of mental disorders and effective treatment. This radical 
shift not only bolstered psychiatrists’ professional status as a medical specialty, it 
also benefited pharmaceutical companies who were in a position to offer 
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psychiatric drugs to people deemed mentally ill. The beneficial relationship 
between psychiatry and the drug industry is troubling. Cosgrove and Wheeler 
(2013) found that of the DSM 5 task force members who oversaw the 
development of the manual, 69% reported having ties to pharmaceutical industry. 
The fact that many of the members had industry ties is problematic because it 
can result in implicit bias among researchers and clinicians. For instance in June 
1999, when the patent for Eli Lilly’s best-seller drug Prozac was scheduled to 
expire, Eli Lilly convened a roundtable discussion to which they invited many 
members of the DSM-IV PMDD subcommittee (Chrisler & Caplan 2002). Shortly 
afterwards, Endicott et al., (1999) published an article indicating that PMDD was 
a real phenomenon and that Prozac was an effective treatment. Eli Lilly was able 
to extent its patent by using the diagnosis of PMDD. A decade later, the DSM 
then used FDA’s approval of Prozac to justify the inclusion of PMDD in DSM 5. 
This shows how scientific integrity can be sacrificed to corporate gain (Cosgrove 
& Wheeler 2013). 
 
3.7.3 What discursive and regulatory practices warrant the 
constructions of premenstrual changes as a psychiatric disorder?  
 
The current analysis found that women do complain of premenstrual distress as 
illustrated by the fact that women have participated in psychiatric, psychological 
and treatment studies. Certainly, Walker (1997) found that in the 1970s, the 
increased acknowledgement of women’s experiences led to an increase in the 
number of women identifying themselves as PMS sufferers and seeking medical 
advice. How did women come to perceive premenstrual changes as a psychiatric 
disorder? And what warrants the construction of premenstrual changes as a 
psychiatric disorder? 
 
This study found that the ‘truths’ presented by psychiatry and psychology has 
been powerful in shaping our understanding of premenstrual changes. These 
‘truths’ may have also made some women believe that they suffer from PMDD. 
Rose (1998) suggests that the ‘truths’ about human wellbeing and diseases 
provided by the ‘psy’ professions (psychology and psychiatry) are not just 
academic; they have a particular kind of social authority that is linked to the 
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government of people. Rose (1998: 75) suggests that through a process of 
‘problematizations’, ‘psy’ professions have rendered problems of the schoolroom, 
the court, the army, the factory, and the family, as their own. Rose (1998: 75) 
notes that in each of these sites, problems would emerge and ‘psy’ professionals 
would find its subjects, scrutinize and study them, elaborate theories to 
understand them, and seek to reform or cure them. In our modern world, 
Foucault suggests that the government of people can be exercised less through 
brutality and more through a subtle process of ‘subjectification’ (Foucault 1977). 
Subjectification is the process whereby judgments that are made about people 
are utilized by individual themselves in order to conduct his or her own conduct 
(Foucault 1977), in other words, the ‘government of the self’ (Rose 1998: 33). 
Rose (1998) argues that the ‘psy’ disciplines have played a key role in the 
formation of self-government and subjectification. They have done this by 
circulating their knowledge into the clinics, schools, hospitals, prisons, and the 
media. In fact, the ‘psy’ professions have made it ‘impossible to conceive of 
personhood’ or ‘to govern oneself or others without psy’ (Rose 1998: 34).  
 
The present study illustrates that the knowledge and ‘truths’ circulated by the 
‘psy’ professions has enabled the construction of PMDD as a real psychiatric 
problem. The ‘psy’ professions have co-opted knowledge from other disciplines 
(e.g. endocrinology, medicine, and biology) and made it their own. These 
knowledges have been reproduced in research journals, books, magazines, self-
help books and disseminated in clinics, courts, and general culture. Markens 
(1996) found that in magazines and self-help books, accounts of women’s 
premenstrual experiences and the use of doctors/expert knowledge has been a 
crucial rhetorical device in establishing PMS as a psychiatric phenomenon. When 
professional frameworks about PMDD are reproduced everywhere within our 
culture, it may become difficult for the public (particularly women who experience 
premenstrual distress) to take a critical stance towards the concept of PMDD. 
Rather, people (and women) may come to incorporate these professional 
frameworks as the truth. Ussher (2003, 2008) argues that it is through the 
process of subjectification that modern women come to label themselves with 
PMS/PMDD. This process of subjectification allows the ‘truths’ about 
premenstrual changes and distress to be reproduced and lived by women 
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(Ussher 2003). Indeed, Ussher (2003) found that throughout women’s narratives, 
PMDD is constructed as a medical phenomenon. 
 
According to Ussher (2008) self-surveillance, self-silencing, self-blame, and self-
sacrifice are some of the apparatuses of subjectification that help women to 
accept the medical construction of premenstrual distress. Ussher associates 
these apparatuses with the dominant constructions of femininity. As mentioned 
earlier, the most dominant constructions of the idealised femininity include the 
positioning of the ‘good’ woman as emotional nurturers of others, responsible, 
and calm. Women, through a process of self-surveillance regulate and govern 
their behaviour according to the ‘good’ woman standard, whilst at the same time, 
they repress the ‘bad’ woman who is selfish, unruly, angry, and irresponsible 
(Ussher 2008). Ussher (2008) suggests that the symptoms most associated with 
the premenstrual phase could be conceptualized as an emergence of emotions 
that are repressed during the majority of the month. Premenstrually, a rupture in 
self-silencing occurs to allow the expression of both day to day frustrations and 
anger associated with more substantial issues as she attempts to live up to 
idealised representations of femininity (Ussher 2003). The rupture is, however, 
followed by increased self-surveillance, leading to guilt, shame, and blaming of 
the body (Ussher 2008). Ussher (2003) notes that women may deal with these 
difficult emotions by splitting off certain emotions and behaviour as ‘not me’ whilst 
maintaining the idealised construction of femininity. Ussher (2008) highlights that 
positioning PMDD as a ‘thing’ performs a regulatory function in women’s lives; it 
allows women to pathologize and split off emotions and behaviours, such as 
feeling out of control or angry, that typically does not conform to the ideal woman 
standard (Ussher 2008). This splitting off allows women to position her ‘true’ self 
as calm, kind to others, rational, and in control of all her responsibilities, whilst 
positioning her ‘PMS self’ as angry, irritable and uncontrollable. The splitting off 
also functions to reinforce the belief that her body is blameworthy and not her 
‘personality’. The discursive construction of blaming the premenstrual body 
functions to exonerate women from responsibility for this fury and allows her to 
disassociate the fury from her sense of self. It is not her that is the monster, it is 
the ‘PMS’, the unruly body that must be constrained and contained (Ussher 
2008). Indeed, research with women experiencing premenstrual distress has 
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illustrated how a medicalized understanding of women’s experiences can serve 
to deflect individual blame and protect their identities (e.g. Ussher 2008; Lafrance 
2007).  
 
3.7.4 What subject positions are enabled and what are the 
implications for action of these subject positions?  
In contemporary society the professions of psychology and psychiatry play a 
central role in occupying certain types of knowledge that give them permission to 
regulate people who are deemed mentally unfit (Rose 1985). The dominant 
discourses have the power to shape our knowledge about madness and our 
practices towards mad people. Though in the case of PMDD, I would argue that 
the knowledge of PMDD and our practices towards women diagnosed with 
PMDD is subtler than say the knowledge and confinement of a person diagnosed 
with ‘schizophrenia’. This subtle knowledge and practices, however, does not 
mean the effect is less damaging, but rather it is more insidious.	  Discourses have 
‘real effects’ in legitimizing particular ‘truths’ as ‘reality’ and legitimizing particular 
practices towards people set in that reality (Walkerdine 1986 in Malson 1998: 27). 
The inclusion of PMDD in the DSM, for example, provides legitimization of PMDD 
as a medical disorder and legitimizes the examination, diagnosis, and treatment 
of women who are deemed to suffer from PMDD. From a Foucauldian 
perspective, discourses produce ‘subject positions’ and identities, which, when 
taken up, have implications for ‘subjectivity’ and experience (Foucault 1972 in 
Malson 1998: 26). According to Foucault, psychiatric knowledge and practice are 
central to the process by which human beings are made subjects (Roberts 2005). 
The knowledge produced by psychiatry as well as the practice of diagnosing 
women with PMDD can position her as a ‘psychiatric subject’. Once made into a 
subject, this can have a negative effect on how she perceives herself and how 
others perceive her. Once assigned to the category of being mentally ill, she is 
subjected to a variety of presuppositions that are associated with the concept of 
‘mental illness’ (Robert 2005). These presuppositions can characterize the 
diagnosed woman as dependent, diminished in thought, unstable, irrational, and 
unpredictable (Robert 2005; Lafrance and McKenzie-Mohr 2013). These 
identities can also be used to ‘legitimize explicit forms of psychiatric power and 
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control, such as compulsory admission’ (Roberts 2005: 39) or pharmaceutical 
treatment of women deemed to be dangerous to themselves (i.e. suicidal) and to 
others (i.e. violent and aggressive). As a result of the categorisation, her 
behaviour and mood may be seen as irrational rather than a reasonable.  
There are profound implications for women who take up the position of the 
‘psychiatric subject’. Being diagnosed with PMDD may impact women in relation 
to the potential negative effects it may have on her relationships with her family, 
her chances of getting highly responsible employment or winning child custody in 
courts, and how she perceives herself. It may also impact how people perceive 
her and her complaints. Caplan et al., (1992) have argued that the existence of a 
formal psychiatric label makes it incomparably more difficult for women branded 
with that label to convince her family, friends, co-workers, employers and 
prospective employers that she is psychologically normal. Moreover her 
complaints are rendered irrelevant. The label of PMDD may invalidate the bad 
feelings and behaviour women may display by conceptualising it as 
incapacitating symptoms of a disorder rather than genuine complaint.  
 
Once given the diagnosis, her negative premenstrual distress are thought of as a 
manifestation of her dysfunctional biology rather than influenced by relational, 
social, cultural and structural factors (e.g. Ussher & Perz 2008). Additionally, the 
drug (Sarafem) that she may be required to take as a ‘psychiatric subject’ has 
numerous side effects that may cause her more harm than good. The side effects 
of Sarafem have been constructed as ‘tolerable’ (e.g. Cunningham et al., 2009: 
129) in the psychiatric literature. The side effects include digestive problems, 
sleep problems, sexual dysfunctions and in some cases, suicidal thoughts and 
violent deaths (e.g. Forsyth v. Eli Lilly 1984, in O’Meara 2001). Strangely, these 
side effects resemble some of the symptoms of PMDD itself. O’Meara (2001) 
reported that many women do not know that Sarafem is really Prozac, and if they 
knew, they might choose not to take the powerful, mind-altering drug. Rather, 
women are told that the pills would turn her back to the calm and contained 
person that she really is. Indeed, Eli Lilly’s advertisement slogan for Safafem “Be 
more like the woman you are” (Chrisler & Caplan 2002: 295) depicts the gender 
ideology that is encompassed in the professional literature on PMDD. A ‘good’ 
woman according to the diagnostic criteria for PMDD is one who is calm, kind, 
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nurturing of others, always in control, and does not experience any fluctuations in 
mood and behaviour. Within the PMDD definition, if a women deviates from these 
stereotypical feminine role by becoming angry, violent, or improperly behaved, 
she is deemed mad. Women who are described as angry and aggressive are 
labelled as mentally disordered for behaving in a way that is perfectly acceptable 
in a man (Jimenez 1997). Ussher (2003) argues that women are in a no-win 
situation. If she displays a range of feminized psychological changes 
premenstrually, primarily anxiety, tearfulness, and depression, she can be 
diagnosed with PMDD - as can woman who contravenes the idealized femininity 
through ‘symptoms’ of anger and irritability.  
3.7.5 Summary of Research Findings 
The analysis revealed that since the 1930s, the construction of premenstrual 
changes has been negative. The literature employed a biomedical approach in 
explaining and treating premenstrual distress. The use of the biomedical 
approach has helped in the process of conceptualising and constructing 
premenstrual distress as a serious psychiatric disorder. Three connected ‘truths’ 
produced and disseminated by psychiatrists and psychologists have helped to 
reify PMDD as a pathological problem. The first of these ‘truths’ proposes that: 
“PMDD is an identifiable condition that can be objectively defined”. The search for 
premenstrual symptomatology, the deliberation over the precise diagnostic 
criteria, and the introduction of standardised questionnaires has helped in the 
conceptualization of PMDD as a distinct psychiatric disorder. Additionally, the 
focus on the emotional aspects rather than the physical changes of premenstrual 
experiences also helped to conceptualise premenstrual distress as a psychiatric 
problem. The second of these ‘truths’ proposes that: “PMDD is an individual 
phenomena that can be treated using medical interventions”. The production of 
hormonal theories and the practice of medical interventions written in the 
psychiatric and psychological literature have helped to conceptualize PMDD as 
an individual phenomenon. Additionally, the lack of attention to social, structural, 
and political factors also contributed to a medical construction of PMDD (Markens 
1996). The third ‘truth’ proposes that: “women with PMDD experience 
incapacitating symptoms”. The symptoms include irritability, depression, lethargy, 
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and anger and exclude any positive changes. The literature has constructed 
PMDD as a disabling illness that can diminish women’s quality of life and impair 
their ability to function at work and in relationships.  
 
Using Foucault’s ideas of knowledge, I sought to find out how these constructions 
and the concept of PMDD per se has been rendered intelligible. The present 
study found that the discourses of science, medicine, and biomedicine have been 
heavily used in the psychiatric and psychological literature on PMDD. The use of 
these discourses and the references to medical, physical, mental and bodily 
events has helped to construct premenstrual distress as a real psychiatric 
disorder. Additionally, medical and scientific language used to produce the three 
‘truths’ has also helped to construct PMDD as a psychiatric disorder. According to 
Foucault, powerful groups create ideologies and distort truth. The present study 
found that scientific researchers, clinicians, doctors, physicians, psychiatrists and 
psychologists have all played a role in defining premenstrual distress as an 
illness. A Foucauldian analysis would argue that the professional construction of 
premenstrual distress as an illness is a distorted version of premenstrual 
experiences that society has accepted as truth. It has been accepted as the truth 
because the literature has drawn heavily on medical and scientific discourses, 
which in Western culture have the power to shape our view of human distress.  
 
I then sought to find out the discursive and regulatory practices that warrant the 
constructions of premenstrual changes as a psychiatric disorder. I was interested 
in finding out how women come to perceive premenstrual changes as a 
psychiatric disorder. The study found that the ‘truths’ about premenstrual distress 
provided by the psychiatry and psychology professions are not just academic. 
The public renders the judgments made by psychology and psychiatry about 
people as truthful to the extent that individuals come to utilize these judgments to 
themselves. The present study illustrates that the knowledge and ‘truths’ 
circulated by the psychiatry and psychology has been a crucial rhetorical device 
in establishing PMDD as a psychiatric phenomenon. These ‘truths’ have, through 
the process subjectification, being incorporated by women who come to label 
themselves with PMDD. Ussher (2003) suggests that positioning PMDD as a 
‘thing’ performs a regulatory function in women’s lives; it allows women to 
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pathologize and split off emotions and behaviours that typically do not conform to 
the ideal woman standard and maintain her sense of femininity. However, 
accepting the diagnosis or being diagnosed does not always have a positive 
function. Rather, being diagnosed with PMDD, which is constructed as a mental 
disorder, can have wider consequences for women. The diagnosis of PMDD can 
legitimize the examination, diagnosis, and treatment of women who are deemed 
to suffer from PMDD. Once assigned to the category of being mentally ill, she 
may be seen as dependent, diminished in thought, irrational, unstable, 
unpredictable and dangerous. The identities can be used to ‘legitimize explicit 
forms of psychiatric control’ (Roberts 2005: 39), such as enforced admission to a 
mental health hospital or treatment with psychiatric drugs that have numerous 
side effects. Being diagnosed with PMDD may impact women and their lives in 
relation to the potential effects on relationships, employment, child custody, and 
on women’s subjective experiences of herself (Caplan et al., 1992). It may also 
impact how people perceive her and her complaints. On one hand, her family, 
friends, colleagues, employers and prospective employers may deem her as 
psychologically abnormal (Caplan et al., 1992) and on the other hand, the PMDD 
label may invalidate her complaints, which are thought of a manifestation of her 
dysfunctional biology rather than influenced by relational, social, cultural and 
structural factors.  
In considering all of the research questions, this study found that so far most ‘psy’ 
research effort has focused on negative changes and failed to consider 
premenstrual changes in a more multifaceted way. The research generally lacked 
in explanations of premenstrual experiences from a non-biomedical framework. 
The literature focused primarily on negative emotional mood symptoms (e.g. 
depression and irritability) and failed to consider physical experiences (e.g. breast 
tenderness, dysmenorrhea, and headaches) which women report around 
menstruation. Moreover, the literature only reported on negative premenstrual 
changes rather than positive ones. King and Ussher (2012) found that many 
women experience a variety of positive changes including feeling happy, 
energetic, increased attractiveness, release of tension, and better social and 
relational functioning. This stands in direct contrast to the accounts of 
premenstrual distress that was found in the analysis. Rather than viewing 
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premenstrual changes as fluid and not inherently negative or positive, the 
mainstream literature and standardized questionnaires have constructed a 
negative portrayal of premenstrual experiences. Chrisler et al., (1994) found that 
when women completed the Menstrual Joy Questionnaire (Delaney et al., 1987) 
more positive accounts of premenstrual change were reported than when they 
completed the Menstrual Distress Questionnaire (Moos 1968). This finding 
illustrates that a variety of premenstrual changes that could be experienced by 
women and what women report in studies may depend on the type of questions 
the researcher asks and the type of experiences the researcher seeks to 
measure.  
 
In considering the research questions, I draw on to the statement that human 
knowledge, experience and perception are bound by time and culture, and are 
mediated historically, culturally and linguistically (Gergen 1985; Burr 2003). This 
statement applies to the knowledge, experience and perception of PMDD. Saying 
PMDD is socially constructed does not mean that women are imagining what 
they feel. Many feminists are aware that premenstrual symptomatology does 
exist, as testified by the high percentage of women who seek treatment, but 
argue that it does not have to be classified as a psychiatric syndrome or as a 
pathological disorder (Ussher 1989, 2003). Nash and Chrisler (1997) suggest that 
the association of premenstrual changes with an official psychiatric diagnosis 
increases people’s tendency to view the premenstrual phase as problematic. This 
increased tendency to view premenstrual changes as problematic will not benefit 
women; rather it will bolster psychiatry’s profession as a medical specialty and 
make serious money for pharmaceutical companies. For all of these reasons, it is 
recommended that the presence of PMDD in the DSM 5 should be reconsidered. 
We must recognise that the way we construct menstruation or menstrual cycle 
experiences has effect on the way we view women and the way we treat them. 
Indeed, as we have seen, PMDD taps into powerful cultural ideas about what it 
means to be a woman and what is considered feminine. There is an urgent need 
for change in our beliefs about menstruation and premenstrual experiences. In 
the case of premenstrual distress, a disorder per se has not been identified. The 
only thing we can be certain of is that some women do experience severe 
premenstrual distress. In that case, it is necessary that we understand those 
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experiences through a framework that incorporates broader social, economic and 
political contexts because evidence suggests that relational, social, economic, 
cultural and structural factors can contribute to, cause or exacerbate, the 
premenstrual physiological and emotional experiences such as stress, anger, and 
fatigue (e.g. Ussher & Perz 2008; Markens 1996). Additionally, women who 
experience distressing premenstrual changes are likely to benefit from support 
that does involve antidepressants, but rather modifications in social and 
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CHAPTER FOUR: SUMMARY, EVALUATION AND IMPLICATION 
 
In this section, I will discuss my findings in relation to the initial aims of the 
research. I will also summarize the findings that emerged from answering the 
research questions. The research study will also be evaluated and 
recommendations for practice and future research will follow.  
4.1. Research Questions  
 
The primary aim of the project was to examine how psychiatric and psychological 
literature has constructed premenstrual changes and how the concept of PMDD 
developed. This study was warranted by the lack of evidence and justification for 
medicalising premenstrual experiences in the DSM. The rationale for the 
research was to find out how this particular aspect of the menstrual cycle became 
medicalized. To do this, I traced the development of the concept of PMDD 
throughout the psychiatric and psychological literature. In doing so, four research 
questions were articulated in this study: 
 
• How do psychological and psychiatric literatures construct premenstrual 
changes?’  
• Under what circumstances are women’s premenstrual changes rendered 
problematic and what professional discourses render these problems 
intelligible? 
• What discursive and regulatory practices warrant the constructions of 
premenstrual changes as a psychiatric disorder?  
• What subject positions are enabled and what are the implications for action of 
these subject positions?  
The main research aim and question has been addressed through the 
presentation of three inter-related constructions/’truths’. Three ‘truths’ produced 
and disseminated by psychiatrists and psychologists have helped to reify PMDD 
as a psychiatric problem. The first of these ‘truths’ proposes that: “PMDD is an 
identifiable condition that can be objectively defined”. The second proposes that: 
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“PMDD is an individual phenomenon that can be treated using medical 
interventions”. The third proposes that: “women with PMDD experience 
incapacitating symptoms”. The literature has constructed PMDD as a disabling 
illness that can diminish women’s quality of life and impair their ability to function 
at work and in relationships. The second research question found that these 
constructions or ‘truths’ have been rendered intelligible because the discourses 
of science, medicine, and biomedicine have been used in the psychiatric and 
psychological literature. In Western cultures, medical and scientific discourses 
have the power to shape our understanding of human distress. The study found 
that scientists, doctors, physicians, psychiatrists and psychologists have played 
a role in defining premenstrual distress as an illness. These professionals have 
the ‘intellectual’ power to define human distress and their definitions have the 
power to become accepted as the ‘truth’, particularly if they use language 
derived from science and medicine. The study found that the ‘truths’ circulated 
by the psychiatry and psychology was a crucial rhetorical device in establishing 
PMDD as a psychiatric phenomenon. Women who come to label themselves 
with PMDD have also through the process subjectification, incorporated these 
‘truths’. Ussher (2003) suggests that positioning PMDD as a ‘thing’ performs a 
regulatory function in women’s lives; it allows women to pathologize and split off 
emotions and behaviours that typically do not conform to the ideal woman 
standard and thus maintain her sense of femininity. However, being diagnosed 
with a mental disorder (i.e. PMDD) can have wider consequences for women. 
The diagnosis of PMDD can legitimize the examination, diagnosis, and treatment 
of women who are deemed to suffer from PMDD. Once assigned to the category 
of being mentally ill, she may be seen as dependent, diminished in thought, 
irrational, unstable, unpredictable and dangerous. Being diagnosed with PMDD 
may impact women and their lives in relation to the potential effects on 
employment, child custody, family relationships, and women’s subjective 
experiences of herself. It may also impact how people perceive her and her 
complaints. 
The study found that so far most ‘psy’ research effort has focused on negative 
premenstrual changes. The research focused primarily on negative mood 
symptoms (e.g. depression and irritability) and failed to consider physical 
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experiences (e.g. breast tenderness, dysmenorrhea, and headaches) and 
positive premenstrual changes. The positive premenstrual experiences can stand 
in direct contrast to the dominant accounts of premenstrual distress reported 
throughout the psychiatric and psychological literature. This suggests that the 
history of premenstrual experiences reported in the mainstream literature is not 
linear, does not show progression since numerous aspects of premenstrual 
experiences have escaped and been ‘excluded’ from the main accounts. The 
literature on premenstrual experiences could have taken various roots if 
constructions other than the negative experiences were considered. For example, 
what is undocumented in the literature is that the scientific study of menstruation 
and the effects of menstruation on women’s mood and behaviour emerged during 
the latter part of nineteenth century, at a time when women were demanding for 
access to higher education and professions. Menstruation then became a liability. 
This means the present concept of PMDD is bound to this historical time and 
culture; PMDD is not the ‘truth’ rather the concept is grounded in a historical 
tradition of problematizing menstruation. If this tradition continues, the inclusion of 
PMDD in DSM 5 may devalue women and result in individual shame, 
discrimination, marginalization, and stigmatization of women. This study 
recommends that the category of PMDD should be excluded from DSM 5. 
4. 2 Evaluation and Critical Review 	  
4.2.1 Limitations of Methodological Approaches Used 
 
The epistemological position I adopted in this research was informed by critical 
realism and material discursive approaches. A Foucauldian Discourse Analysis 
(FDA) and a Foucauldian genealogical approach were undertaken. These types 
of methodologies have not been used to understand the constructions of 
premenstrual distress in the context of DSM. A genealogical approach and FDA 
was considered the most suitable method for exploring how premenstrual 
changes have been constructed, how the concept of PMDD emerged and how it 
impacts practices, subject positions and subjectivity. However, these 
methodologies are not without criticisms.  
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A general criticism of qualitative research is that this type of methodology does 
not provide the researcher with certainty or predictability (Willig 2008). It cannot, 
as opposed to studies taking a positivist epistemology, make prediction of cause 
and effect or declare the findings with certainty. The current research involved the 
negotiation of meanings and interpretations made by the researcher, and since 
the researcher’s objectivity is an ideal rather than a reality, alternative 
interpretations of the data are always possible (Willig 2008). FDA has been 
criticized for being inconsistently applied and involving a certain amount of 
interpretation and understanding on the part of the researcher (Willig 2008). 
Similar criticisms could be made towards a genealogy methodology. I recognize 
that if another researcher was to read and analyze the same data I had read and 
analyzed, their analysis (or interpretation) could have been different to mine. I 
recognize that the analysis has been influenced by my own subject position 
(Willig 2008). My subject position has been influenced by feminists’ approaches 
and by my own experiences of premenstrual changes.  
A specific criticism of FDA, pointed out by Willig (2008), is that this methodology 
lacks a theory of how individuals can take up or resist particular subject position. 
There are some who argue that the mere availability of subject positions in 
discourse cannot account for the emotional investment individuals make in 
particular discursive positions and their attachment to those positions (Willig 
2008). Moreover, discourse analysis does not clarify the way in which social and 
material reality in turn may impact upon the discourse (Willig 2008). If discourse 
does, indeed, construct reality, then to what extent can ‘reality’ be said to 
constrain discourse? (Willig 2008) And can we conceive reality as something 
separate from, or outside of, discourse? The relation between discourse and 
material reality is a complex one and discourse analysts cannot fully resolve this 
difficulty (Willig 2008).   
In general, Foucauldian analysis (and indeed other social constructionist 
approaches) can be criticized because their focus on language can lead to 
relativism (if everything is text how can any judgments be made of one version 
against another?) and an inability to address the real and material consequences.  
Pilgrim (2013) has criticized constructionist approaches for taking a purely 
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relativist standpoint and for neglecting the contexts that can lead to emotional 
difficulties. Pilgrim (2013: 158) suggests that ‘misery is not socially constructed 
by-products of psychiatric discursive practices’, rather, the meanings people 
ascribe to their problem and the actual events in people’s everyday lives such as 
losses, insults and future threats might be relevant to the expression and 
understanding of ‘misery’. Similarly, Sims-Schouten, Riley and Willig (2007: 102) 
have also criticized discourse analysis for prioritizing discourse over materiality 
and for marginalizing any experiences that are ‘out of the realm of language’ i.e. 
embodied premenstrual experiences. According to Sims-Schouten, Riley and 
Willig (2007: 118) language does not solely and independently constitute our 
world; rather ‘constructions and understandings of the world are formed and 
shaped by extra-discursive factors’. In line with this, I understand that the over 
emphasis on semantics can be seen as a problem with FDA (and other 
constructionist approaches). However, I have drawn on feminist/materialist 
approaches in an attempt to circumvent these limitations and redress this 
balance. The feminist/materialist approaches have allowed me to offer a social 
critique rather than simply examine the constitutive role of language. Taking a 
feminist/materialistic approach also made it possible for me to engage with the 
material impact premenstrual distress can have on women. In the analysis, I have 
attempted to identify how certain discourses have turned premenstrual changes 
into an object that can be classified, explained, and acted upon. I also attempted 
to highlight the communicative features inherent in the texts by bringing forth the 
subject positions of those who are diagnosed with PMS or categorize themselves 
as PMS sufferer. This interpersonal meaning is focused on the doing in language 
and not merely on the semantics or contents.  
4.2.2 Research Process 
 
All procedures for data selection and analysis were followed as stated in the 
methodology sections. The data was chosen rigorously and recommended 
guidelines for FDA (e.g. Willig 2008) were followed. See Appendix 3 for Analytic 
Steps. 
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4.2.3 Reflexivity 
 
Willig (2008) highlighted the importance of researcher reflexivity in good 
qualitative research. This refers to an examination of how researcher’s own 
assumptions and biases might influence the research procedures and 
interpretation of the findings. Harper (2003) proposes that to maintain a reflexive 
position, researchers should draw attention to and continuously review their role 
in their research process. Through supervision and keeping a reflective journal, I 
was able to give attention to how my personal, professional, historical and 
cultural context had influenced my analysis and understandings. There are 
various contexts that initially influenced my decision to focus on menstruation as 
a topic for research. I felt that being a woman experiencing variable and fluid 
premenstrual changes made it easier for me to be critical of the data and of the 
medicalization of premenstrual experiences. I did not have favourable attitudes 
towards psychiatric understandings of premenstrual experiences. My beliefs were 
influenced by my embodied experiences, by my professional background 
grounded in critical clinical psychology and feminist approaches, and by my 
upbringing. The menstrual taboo is deeply embedded within my culture and 
religion. In Islam, during menstruation, women are forbidden to practice in certain 
religious obligations such as worshipping in mosques, praying five times a day, 
fasting in the month of Ramadan and reading the Quran. I felt these practices to 
be silencing and isolating.  
Upon reflection, I feel that the analysis of the data focused more on doing a 
Foucauldian discourse analysis rather than a genealogy. I struggled to bring 
together the genealogy and the discourse analysis aspects of the data analysis. 
This struggle may have emerged because my understanding of how to carry out 
a genealogical analysis was limited. As mentioned in the methodology section, 
Foucault did not set out a procedure of specific techniques for carrying out 
genealogical analysis, rather he insisted on not following any specific 
methodology to do a genealogy. Restricted by this, I read a few articles that 
attempted to make the genealogical method usable. However this did not raise 
my confidence about how I could go about doing a genealogy. From the reading, 
I understood that a genealogy is a methodology that examines the history of the 
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present. With this understanding, I started to look for social and political events 
that were occurring at the same time the papers on PMS were being published, 
with a particular focus on the events surrounding the DSM editions. In the 
analysis, I attempted to highlight that the concept of PMS/PMDD emerged out of 
certain social and political agendas rather than it being ‘discovered’ at some point 
in history as a real medical or psychiatric condition. I also explored some of the 
discursive and non-discursive practices that have influenced our present 
knowledge of premenstrual changes.  
 
4.2.4 Contributing in Advancing Wider Knowledge 
 
I argue that the constructions presented in relation to women’s premenstrual 
experiences shed light on the way women’s premenstrual experiences, which are 
hugely variable from one woman to another and not entirely fixed for an individual 
woman, have been pathologised as a result of institutional practices, namely 
psychology and psychiatry. The study contributes to wider knowledge by 
illustrating that the biomedical theory is limited in its approach because it cannot 
explain the full range of premenstrual changes that women experience. This 
study offers a critique of the inclusion of PMDD in the DSM on the grounds that 
the ‘truths’ circulated by the psychiatry and psychology was not based on 
scientific evidence, rather numerous rhetorical devices were used to establish 
PMDD as a psychiatric phenomenon. This adds to wider knowledge by illustrating 
that the medicalisation of premenstrual changes within the DSM is not warranted 
and therefore the category of PMDD should be eliminated.  
 
4.3 Recommendations for Clinical Practice  
 
1. The category of ‘Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder’ should not be included 
in DSM 5 (APA, in press) due for publication in May 2013. The study did not 
find support for the inclusion.  
 
2. Awareness of menstruation and the premenstrual phase as a 
biopsychosocial process should be increased among professionals who 
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work with women complaining of premenstrual distress. This approach 
enables one to understand that menstrual cycle is a normal process that 
both affects and is affected by mood and behaviour. This means every 
woman will experience menstruation differently. 
 
3. Professionals working in service areas where women may present with 
premenstrual distress should be aware that these women may have other 
outstanding concerns such as relationship or work difficulties that may be 
exacerbating their premenstrual distress. Appropriate help should be given 
to these women whose premenstrual experience is affected by structural, 
material, social and cultural factors.  
 
4. In working with women complaining of premenstrual distress, clinical 
psychologists should be aware of alternative frameworks (see Ussher 2003) 
that position premenstrual distress as a normal part of women’s experience. 
Alternative frameworks such as Eastern approaches and Narrative therapy 
can acknowledge pain and distress in a non-pathological way and find 
creative solutions for positive change in their lives. Clinical psychology may 
also benefit from using interventions that are used by feminist approaches. 
These approaches can help women to resist labeling themselves as ill and 
exploring how cultural constructions of femininity can impact upon women’s 
premenstrual experience.  
 
5. Clinical psychologists need to develop full understanding of gender and 
power as well as the social, cultural, and economic circumstances of 
women lives and understand how these factors lead to emotional distress. 
Clinical psychologists will need to use this knowledge to provide appropriate 
support to women. 
 
6. On a community level, the attitudes of menstruation needs shifting 
otherwise negative stereotypes will persist and women will continue to be 
medicalized. Clinical training and educational programs should focus on 
educating women and men about the menstrual cycle from a 
biopsychosocial context.  
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7. On a public level, feminist self-help texts, web based information, 
magazines, and books should be composed and disseminated into the 
mainstream popular culture. These texts will need to highlight that 
premenstrual distress is more than just a women’s physical or mental health 
issue because it taps into powerful cultural ideas about what it means to be 
a woman.  
 
4.4 Recommendations for Further Research  
 
1. What are women’s experiences of premenstrual distress/change? The 
voices of women who attend clinics or seek help for premenstrual distress 
remain largely undocumented in the psychiatric and psychological literature. 
Further research should explore how women view, make sense of and cope 
with premenstrual distress/changes.  
 
2. Research on non-Western women and diverse ethnicities has been 
severely limited. Further research should attempt to address this imbalance 
through exploring how women from a variety of cultures understand and 
experience premenstrual changes. This might provide different findings.  
 
3. Previous research studies have reported that negative premenstrual 
experiences can impair a women’s ability to function at work and in her 
social life. Women’s views on this have been neglected in the research. 
Research should attempt to address this gap in the literature through 
exploring the effects of premenstrual experiences on women’s work, social 
and family life, how it impacts those areas and what women do to cope. 
This may reveal that changes in home and work environments i.e. working 
patterns and reducing demands of everyday tasks, may help women cope 
better with premenstrual changes or experience different premenstrual 
changes altogether.   
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4. Psychiatric and psychological research studies have predominantly focused 
on negative premenstrual change and failed to examine positive 
premenstrual experiences. Future research should address this imbalance 
by studying positive premenstrual changes as this may offer different 
findings.  
 
5. Psychiatric and psychological research studies have predominantly focused 
on emotional changes and failed to consider physical experiences (e.g. 
breast tenderness, dysmenorrhea, and headaches) which women report 
around menstruation. Further research should explore how physical 
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APPENDIX ONE – DATABASE SEARCH RESULTS 
 
Search Results for ‘Premenstrual’ in PubMed Database 
 





Pre DSM-5 2008 - 2013 4873 10  2 
Post DSM-IV 1994 - 1999 720 10  2 
Pre DSM-IV 1986 - 1993 1021 10  2 
Post DSMIII 1980 - 1985 476  10  0 
Pre DSM-III 1974 - 1979 277  10  2 
Post DSM-II 1968 – 1973 202  10  0 
Pre DSM-II 1963 – 1968 177  5  0 
Post DSM-I 1952 - 1957 129 10 3 
Pre DSM-I 1947 - 1952 48  6  0 
Pre DSM 1800 - 1946 8  2  3 
 
Search Results for ‘Premenstrual’ in PsychINFO Database 
 




Pre DSM-5 2008 - 2013 302  10  7 
Post DSM-IV 1994 - 1999 400  10 3 
Pre DSM-IV 1986 - 1993 652  10 2 
Post DSM-III 1980 - 1985 167  10 1 
Pre DSM-III 1974 - 1979 78  10 2 
Post DSM-II 1968 – 1973 35  5  3 
Pre DSM-II 1963 – 1968 21  0 4 
Post DSM-I 1952 - 1957 9  2 1 
Pre DSM-I 1947 - 1952 4  1 0 
Pre DSM 1800 - 1946 11  1 1 
 
Search Results for ‘Premenstrual’ in ScienceDirect Database 
 
DSM  Date Result
s  





Pre DSM-5 2008 - 2013 2406  10 1 
Post DSM-IV 1994 - 1999 1539  10 1 
Pre DSM- V 1986 - 1993 1366  10 1 
Post DSM-III 1980 - 1985 513  10 1 
Pre DSM-III 1974 - 1979 235  10 0 
Post DSM-II 1968 – 1973 101  5 0 
Pre DSM-II 1963 – 1968 120  9 0 
Post DSM-I 1952 - 1957 61  0 1 
Pre DSM-I 1947 - 1952 46  0 0 
Pre DSM 1800 - 1946 176  0 6 
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APPENDIX TWO – ARTICLES SELECTED FOR ANALYSIS 
 
 
Articles (47 in total) included in the analysis (descending order).   
 
Epperson et al., (2012). Premenstrual dysphoric disorder: evidence for a new category 
for DSM-5.  
 
Hartlage et al., (2012). Criteria for premenstrual dysphoric disorder: secondary analyses 
of relevant data sets.  
 
Cunningham et al., (2009) Update on research and treatment of Premenstrual dysphoric 
disorder. 
 
Gehlert et al., (2009). The prevalence of premenstrual dysphoric disorder in a randomly 
selected group of urban and rural women.  
 
Knaapen & Weisz (2008). The biomedical standardization of premenstrual syndrome.  
 
Pearlstein & Steiner (2008). Premenstrual dysphoric disorder: burden of illness.  
 
Protopopescue et al., (2008). Toward a functional neuroanatomy of premenstrual 
dysphoric disorder.  
 
Protopopescue et al., (2008). Hippocampal structural changes across the menstrual 
cycle.  
 
Reed et al., (2008). Changes in mood, cognitive performance and appetite in the late 
luteal and follicular phase of the menstrual cycle in women with and without PMDD 
(Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder).  
 
Yonkers et al., (2008). Premenstrual syndrome.  
 
Endicott et al., (1999). Is premenstrual dysphoric disorder a distinct clinical entity?  
 
Steiner et al., (1999). The measurement of premenstrual mood symptoms.  
 
Bloch et al., (1998). Pituitary-adrenal hormones & testosterone across the menstrual 
cycle in women with premenstrual syndrome and controls.  
 
Bloch et al., (1997). Premenstrual syndrome: evidence for symptom stability across 
cycles.  
 
Steiner (1997). Premenstrual syndromes.  
 
Richardson (1995). The premenstrual syndrome: A brief history. 
 
Hurt et al., (1992). LLPDD in 670 women evaluated for premenstrual complaints.  
 
Rodin (1992). The social construction of premenstrual syndrome.  
 
Schmidt et al., (1991). Lack of effect of induced mensus on symptoms in women with 
premenstrual syndrome.  
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Haskett & Abplanalp (1983) Premenstrual tension syndrome: Diagnostic criteria and 
selection of research subjects.  
 
Steiner et al., (1980). Premenstrual tension syndrome: the development of research 
diagnostic criteria and new rating scales.  
 
Carroll & Steiner (1978) The psychobiology of premenstrual dysphoria: the role of 
prolactin.  
 
Steiner & Carroll (1977). The psychobiology of premenstrual dysphoria: review of 
theories and treatments. 321-335. 
 
Golub (1976). The magnitude of premenstrual anxiety and depression. 
 
Golub (1976). The effect of premenstrual anxiety and depression on cognitive function.  
 
Janowsky et al., (1973). Correlations between mood, weight & electrolytes during the 
menstrual cycle: a renin-angiotensin-aldosterone hypothesis of premenstrual tension  
 
Parlee (1973). The premenstrual syndrome.  
 
Sommer (1973). The effect of menstruation on cognitive and perceptual-motor 
behaviour: a review. 
 
Dalton (1961). Menstruation and crime.  
Dalton (1960). Menstruation and accidents.  
 
Dalton (1960b). Effects of menstruation on school girls weekly work.  
 
Dalton (1959). Menstruation and acute psychiatric illnesses.  
Simmons (1956). Premenstrual tension; review of 288 cases.  
 
Greene & Dalton (1954). Discussion on the premenstrual syndrome.  
 
Greene & Dalton (1953). The premenstrual syndrome 
 
Rees (1953) Premenstrual tension syndrome and its treatment.  
 
Cline (1946) Etiology of premenstrual tension and the rationale of its treatment. 
 
Reimann (1946) Habitual hyperthermia; premenstrual fever. 
 
Seward (1944) Psychological effects of the menstrual cycle on women workers.  
 
Holtz (1941) Should women fly during the menstrual period?  
 
Frank (1940) Puberty, menstruation, pregnancy. 
 
Benedek & Rubenstein (1939). The correlations between ovarian activity and 
psychodynamic processes. I. The ovulative phase. 
Lough (1937) A psychological study of functional periodicity.  
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Goldschmidt (1934) The menstrual taboo and woman’s psychology.  
 
Johnson (1932). The effects of periodicity on learning to walk a tight-wire.  
 
Frank (1931). The hormonal causes of premenstrual tension.  
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APPENDIX THREE – ANALYTIC STEPS 
 
Step 1 
In the analysis, I read all the data twice and looked for interesting features and 
themes. I kept notes of how each source began its presentation, what symptoms 
were listed, what theories were given to explain premenstrual distress, what 
treatment or therapeutic methods were discussed and recommended. I then went 
through my notes of the themes and features and extracted (copying word for 
word) large excerpts from each article and placed them in a word document 
accordingly to categories below: 
 
1. Symptoms, prevalence  
2. Diagnostic criteria or category 




Once the data was transferred on to a word document, I changed the document 
format to make the margins on the right hand larger. In this space, I entered my 
own comments and ideas on constructions, practices, subject positions, 
discourses, who was quoted, how women with premenstrual distress were being 
constructed, what was missing/unsaid, what did not make sense, and any 
contradictories. I kept reading, comparing different extracts, reading in detail and 
making notes of my reading, thinking and initial stage of analyzing.  
Step 3 
At this point, I used the steps outlined by Willig (2008) on doing Foucauldian 
Discourse Analysis. In this part, I read my extensive notes and also the data 
again and looked for the different ways in which the premenstrual 
changes/distress were constructed in the text and what discourses these 
constructions may have drawn from. I paid close attention to the language and 
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terminologies that were being used to describe premenstrual changes, its 
causes, the effects, and treatment. Thereafter, I thought about the action 
orientation and the functions of the constructions. I then looked for what subject 
positions that they offered and what this meant in terms of what can be done to 
these subjects. In the final stage of this analysis, I reflected on the consequences 
of women taking up various subject positions and what this means for their 
subjectivity. For each of the stages, I selected extracts that best reflected the 
ways premenstrual changes were medicalized.  
Step 4 
In the fourth stage of my analysis, I examined the data to answer the research 
questions: 
 
1. How do psychological and psychiatric literatures construct premenstrual 
changes?’  
2. Under what circumstances are women’s premenstrual changes rendered 
problematic and what professional discourses render these problems 
intelligible? 
3. What discursive and regulatory practices warrant the constructions of 
premenstrual changes as a psychiatric disorder?  
4. What subject positions are enabled and what are the implications for 
action of these subject positions?  
I evaluated how premenstrual changes were constructed (e.g. positive, negative, 
risks, incapacitating, dangerous), the way it was problematized and medicalized 
and what circumstances had rendered these constructions intelligible. And once 
again, I wrote about the impact the constructions have on women and their 
subjective experience. 
Step 5 
A list of key constructions was drawn up based on these analysis. During this 
process, it was possible to identify three distinct arrays of inter-connected 
constructions, examples from which would serve to address the research 
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questions. Specific extracts were considered in terms of how they might or might 
not exemplify this. 
Step 6 
In this stage of the analysis, I brought together all of the studies from each period 
and merged the analysis that were similar. The analysis showed that the 
constructions were similar throughout the literature. I chose extracts that 
supported one another to add to the construction of premenstrual changes. 
Extracts were used to demonstrate the key constructions of premenstrual 
changes. The constructions were organized by time period. Throughout the 
literature, three interrelated constructions about premenstrual changes was 
produced to reify premenstrual changes as a psychiatric problem. Extracts were 
carefully chosen to represent this.  
Step 7 
The final stage of the analysis involved the write up. Here I organized my analysis 
around the DSM editions. For each period, there was approximately 2-3 ways 
that premenstrual distress was constructed, all supported by extracts. 	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APPENDIX FOUR – EXAMPLE OF INITIAL ANALYSIS 	  
	  	  	  	  	  
